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Implementing a Public Health Perspective in
FDA Drug Regulation
PATRICIA J. ZETTLER, MARGARET FOSTER RILEY, AND
AARON S. KESSELHEIM*

ABSTRACT
There is, without question, a public health crisis in the United States arising from
both illicit and prescription opioid misuse, addiction, and overdose. The Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) is one regulator with an important role to play in
minimizing the harms associated with prescription opioids, while also ensuring that
prescription opioids are available for the evidence-based management of pain. One
question, however, is to what extent the agency can consider in its decisions to
approve opioids and keep existing ones on the market the provider and patient
behaviors contributing to the epidemic. This is, in part, because FDA’s approval of
drugs is often understood as narrowly focused on weighing the benefits and risks of
the products as defined in the preapproval clinical trials that are used to set the drug’s
official FDA-approved indication. Such a limited focus would exclude important
information about the real-world use and public-health impact of prescription opioids
and other drugs with externalities. This Article argues that, to better regulate drugs
like opioids that have such externalities, one step FDA should take is to use a “public
health” perspective in its approval (and withdrawal) decisions. The Article describes
how the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act authorizes FDA to take this broad
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approach in its drug approval and withdrawal decisions and offers some principles
for implementing this approach systematically.

INTRODUCTION
Although the steady increase in opioid prescribing that began in the 1990s has
now begun to decrease, opioid prescribing in the United States remains high, far
beyond prescribing rates in comparable countries around the world.1 In 2015, the
amount of morphine milligram equivalents prescribed per capita was approximately
three times as high as it was in 1999,2 and about 300 million opioid prescriptions
were written.3 Alongside this high level of prescribing, the United States has also
experienced a dramatic increase in opioid misuse, addiction, and overdose over the
past two decades—with opioids causing over 42,000 deaths in 2016, and prescription
opioids contributing to about 40% of those deaths.4 Minimizing the harms associated
with both prescription and illicit opioids that have given rise to this crisis,5 while also
ensuring that prescription opioids are available for the evidence-based management
of pain, will require a comprehensive, long-term effort from a wide range of
stakeholders and regulators.6 FDA, through its authority over the drug market,
undoubtedly has an important role to play in this landscape.7
1 See, e.g., Eriko Onishi et al, Comparison of Opioid Prescribing Patterns in the United States and
Japan: Primary Care Physicians’ Attitudes and Perceptions, 30 J. AM. BRD FAM. MED. 248, 249 (2017);
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT OF DRUG-RELATED
RISKS AND OUTCOMES (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/pubs/2017-cdc-drug-surveillancereport.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2AL-SWYG] [hereinafter 2017 CDC Report]; see also Benedikt Fischer et
al., Non-Medical use of Prescription Opioids and Prescription Opioid-Related Harms: Why So Markedly
Higher in North American Compared to the Rest of the World?, 109 ADDICTION 177, 178 (2013) (“The
United States consumes the vast majority of the world’s [prescription opioid] supply . . . .”).
2 See, e.g., Gery P. Guy Jr. et al., Vital Signs: Changes in Opioid Prescribing in the United States,
2006–2015, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (July
7, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/wr/mm6626a4.htm; [https://perma.cc/MU2W-8VEQ].
3 See Dina Gusovsky, Americans Consume Vast Majority of the World’s Opioids, CNBC (Apr. 27,
2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/04/27/americans-consume-almost-all-of-the-global-opioid-supply.html.
[https://perma.cc/AM6C-ZKS2].
4 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Opioid Overdose, https://www.cdc.gov/drug
overdose/index.html; see also Leo Beletsky et al., Fatal Re-Entry: Legal and Programmatic Opportunities
to Curb Opioid Overdose Among Individuals Newly Released from Incarceration, 7 NE. U.L.J. 149, 150
(2015) (describing the “public health crisis” of opioid overdose); Ameet Sarpatwari et al., The Opioid
Epidemic: Fixing A Broken Pharmaceutical Market, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 464 (2017) (“It is
difficult to overstate the extent of opioid overuse and misuse in the United States.”).
5 In addition to prescription opioids, illicit opioids, such as heroin and synthetic fentanyl, clearly
also play a central role in the current U.S. opioid epidemic. The markets for prescription and illicit opioids
cannot be viewed in isolation, and in recent years illicit, not prescription, opioids have driven much of the
increase in overdose deaths. See, e.g., 2017 CDC Report, supra note 1, at 8, 20–22; see also Wilson M.
Compton et al., Relationship Between Non-medical Prescription Opioid Use and Heroin Use, 374 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 154, 160 (2016) (finding that a majority of heroin users report using prescription opioids
before heroin initiation); Pradip K. Muhuri et al., Associations of Nonmedical Pain Reliever Use and
Initiation of Heroin Use in the United States, CBHSQ DATA REVIEW (Aug. 2013),
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/DR006/DR006/nonmedical-pain-reliever-use-2013.htm.
[https://perma.cc/NZ9K-PSH2] (finding same). But the focus of this Article is on FDA’s role in helping to
address the ways that prescription opioids contribute to the problem while also ensuring that prescription
opioids remain available for appropriate, evidence-based pain management.
THE
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A key question relating to FDA’s role in the U.S. prescription opioid epidemic is
to what extent FDA can consider, or regulate, the health care provider and patient
behaviors that contribute to over-prescribing and misuse of these drugs. This is, in
part, because the standard for approval in the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) describes drug safety and effectiveness in terms of “the conditions
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling.”8 Accordingly,
FDA’s evaluation of drugs is often understood as being what we call “drug-specific.”
That is, the agency is viewed as solely focused on the benefits and risks of the
products as defined in the preapproval clinical trials that are used to set the drug’s
official FDA-approved indication, which are generally short-term studies in highlyselected populations. Likewise, after approval, FDA’s regulatory decision making is
traditionally conceived as being restricted to addressing the use of the drug as
described in FDA-approved labeling, even though providers and patients prescribe or
use drugs in ways that deviate from that labeling.9
For prescription opioids, such a drug-specific focus clearly would exclude
important information about the real-world use and public-health impact of this drug
class. In addition, although opioids provide a particularly salient example of a drug
class with the potential for externalities, they are not the only such class of
prescription drugs. Other FDA-approved prescription drugs and drug classes have
effects beyond the individual being treated, including those with the potential for

OPIOID Use 1–17 (Jonathan K. Phillips, Morgan A. Ford & Richard J. Bonnie eds., 2017),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK458660/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK458660.pdf [hereinafter NAS
REPORT]; see also Richard J. Bonnie et al., Both Urgency and Balance Needed in Addressing Opioid
Epidemic: A Report from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 318 JAMA
423, 423–24 (2017).
7 See, e.g., Scott Gottlieb & Janet Woodcock, Marshaling FDA Benefit-Risk Expertise to Address
the Current Opioid Abuse Epidemic, 318 JAMA 421, 421 (2017).
8 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). There are other reasons that one might question FDA’s ability to regulate
provider and patient behaviors. For example, FDA oversight has long been characterized as distinct from
medical practice regulation. See, e.g., Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs;
Prescribing for Uses Unapproved by the FDA, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503, 16,504 (proposed Aug. 15, 1972).
Notwithstanding this conventional wisdom, the agency indirectly regulates or influences provider
behavior in various ways, such as through requiring Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS).
See, e.g., Lewis Grossman, Drugs, Biologics, and Devices: FDA Regulation, Intellectual Property, and
Medical Products in the American Healthcare System, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW
637 (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison Hoffman & William Sage eds., 2016) (describing FDA’s indirect regulation
of medical practice); Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the Practice of
Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 173 (2004) (“[T]he FDA undoubtedly affects the practice of medicine,
even if only indirectly.”); Margaret Foster Riley, An Unfulfilled Promise: Changes Needed to the Drug
Approval Process to Make Personalized Medicine A Reality, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 289, 308 (2015) (“In
2007, FDAAA introduced potentially far-reaching limits on the practice of medicine doctrine allowing
FDA to impose restrictions (e.g. place and mode of use) on approved drugs.”); Patricia J. Zettler, Toward
Coherent Federal Oversight of Medicine, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 427, 498 (describing FDA’s REMS
authority as indirectly regulating medical practice); see also Barbara J. Evans, Distinguishing Product and
Practice Regulation in Personalized Medicine, 81 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 288, 288
(2007) (describing “the crucial distinction between product and practice regulation”); Scott Gottlieb, Drug
Safety Proposals and the Intrusion of Federal Regulation into Patient Freedom and Medical Practice, 26
HEALTH AFFAIRS 664, 672 (2007) (describing RiskMAPs as “put[ting] the FDA squarely in the role of
dictating medical practice standards and promoting specific clinical behavior”).
9 See, e.g., Tewodros Eguale et al., Drug, Patient, and Physician Characteristics Associated with
Off-Label Prescribing in Primary Care, 172 ARCHIVE INTERNAL MED. 781, 781 (2012) (describing the
prevalence of off-label prescribing); Aaron S. Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and Promotion: Balancing
Public Health Goals and Commercial Speech, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 234 (2011) (describing same).
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misuse, such as benzodiazepines approved to treat anxiety, and those without the
potential for misuse, such as antibiotics, which, when used inappropriately,
accelerate the development of resistant bacteria.10
Thus, to better regulate prescription opioids and other drugs with externalities, one
step FDA should take is to use a broad perspective in its approval (and withdrawal)
decisions, by incorporating information in addition to that used in a conventional,
drug-specific approach. We call this a “public health” basis for decision-making. In
fact, a close review of FDA regulatory history reveals that for some decisions about
specific drugs and drug classes, including certain opioids, FDA already does this by
incorporating information outside the approved labeling—such as population health
impacts and how providers and patients actually use drugs—in its decisions.11 In this
Article, we review how the FDCA authorizes FDA to take such a public health
approach not only in its efforts to influence provider and patient behavior through
labeling, risk evaluation and mitigation strategies, and other tools, but also in its
approval and withdrawal decisions. FDA would effectively serve its mission by
consistently using its authority to incorporate public health considerations into
approval and withdrawal decisions for drugs with a high potential for externalities.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains the challenges of regulating
drugs with externalities, using prescription opioids as a paradigmatic example that
demonstrates the need for the agency to incorporate public health considerations in
its oversight of drugs. Part II describes FDA’s legal authority to take this broad
approach in its drug approval and withdrawal decisions. Finally, Part III offers some
principles for implementing this approach systematically to meet public health goals.

I. PRESCRIPTION OPIOIDS AND THE CHALLENGE OF
REGULATING DRUGS WITH EXTERNALITIES
For many drugs, safety and effectiveness can be well-understood through FDA’s
traditional, drug-specific regulatory process that focuses on the benefits and risks of
the drug as shown in preapproval clinical trials, and then used as described in FDAapproved labeling after marketing. Prescription opioids, however, are an example of
when this regulatory model cannot provide a comprehensive picture of the drugs’
impact on patients and the public health. This Part first provides background on the
role of prescription opioids in the current opioid epidemic, including how provider
and patient behaviors influence the drugs’ risks. Then it describes how FDA has
addressed this public health problem through its conventional, drug-specific
regulatory approach, in the context of its shared jurisdiction with the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA).

10 See, e.g., Xanax (alprazolam) Labeling, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/
2016/018276s052lbl.pdf; [https://perma.cc/M9GA-C6D5]; FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Battle of the Bugs:
Fighting Antibiotic Resistance, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143568.htm.
[https://perma.cc/K6ZN-L4U8]. For additional examples of other drugs and drug classes that, like opioids,
may have externalities, see infra notes 170–174 and accompanying text.
11

See Section II.A., infra.
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A. The Current Opioid Crisis
Prescription opioids are clearly associated with numerous risks for users that have
given rise to the current opioid crisis.12 These include some risks that might be easily
understood to be medical, or public health, concerns, such as death resulting from
overdose, developing a substance use disorder, or impaired cognitive function, as
well as less severe, but still debilitating, symptoms like constipation.13 The risks
associated with prescription opioid use also include harms that may not as easily be
understood to be matters of public health, but arguably ought to be. These include
outcomes such as users transitioning from prescription to illicit opioids like heroin,
or negative effects on users’ families’ well-being.14
How opioids are prescribed and used influence these risks associated with the
products.15 For example, the formulation (e.g., extended- or immediate-release),
dosage, and number of days’ supply all have an effect on the risk of developing a
substance use disorder or of overdosing.16 Similarly, the route of administration—
which a patient or user might have control over, for example by crushing a pill to
snort or inject it—affects the risks associated with opioids.17
Although many of the risks of opioids are now well-known, opioids also have
been some of the most effective analgesics available, and pain is a widespread,
complex, and serious public health problem.18 Perhaps unsurprisingly given the
potential benefits of prescription opioids for pain management and the way behaviors
influence the drugs’ risks, the current opioid crisis developed alongside increased
prescribing of opioids and recognition of the under-treatment of pain, as well as
industry marketing of prescription opioids.

1. The Profound Difficulties of Treating Pain
Pain is the perception manifest from nociceptive stimuli in internal tissues and
external insults detected by peripheral sensors in the body.19 It is a complex
physiologic process, involving many different forms of pain encoded by a number of
neural circuits.20 Pain may be expressed in numerous forms, for example, stabbing,
pricking, burning or aching, and may also produce diverse emotions and sensations.21
Pain also arises in multiple clinical contexts, and each context, and sometimes each
individual patient, raises specific issues that need to be addressed in distinct ways.
For example, the pain requiring treatment may be acute, as a result of surgery or an
injury, such as might occur from playing a sport. Likewise, dental procedures may

12

For a full examination of the risks of opioids, see, e.g., the NAS REPORT, supra note 6.

13

NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 120 (citing Howard L. Fields, Should We Be Reluctant to
Prescribe Opioids for Chronic Non-malignant Pain?, 129 PAIN 233 (2007)).
14

See id. at 388, 393.

15

See, e.g., id. at 196.

16

See, e.g., id. at 191–93.

17

See, e.g., id.

18

See id. at 120.

19

Cedric Piers & Rebecca Seal, Neural Circuits for Pain: Recent Advances and Current Views, 354
SCIENCE 578 (2016).
20

Id.

21

Id.
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cause acute pain. Pain may also be chronic, for example, from arthritis, fibromyalgia,
and back pain. Pain also may be associated with cancer treatment and end-of-life
care. Each individual setting, and patient within that setting, may present special
characteristics that may make the pain treatments more or less likely to pose risks of
misuse.
In the 1990s, the challenges of pain management, and more specifically, the
under-assessment and under-treatment of pain, became a leading medical concern.22
There was ample evidence of this problem; once asked, many patients reported pain
that was not only untreated, but largely unnoticed.23 Pain control advocates noted
that patients were often left with long-term intractable pain. At the time, advocates
also believed that physicians’ reluctance to prescribe opioids because of concerns
about the potential for addiction was misplaced. Among other things, they pointed to
a now-widely-cited one-paragraph letter to the editor in a leading medical journal
that reported that a review of medical records suggested that addiction was rare when
opioids were used in hospitalized patients without a history of addiction.24 Another
article published in 1986 argued that opioids could safely be used for non-cancerrelated pain.25 Despite the relatively small sample size of that study, its premise was
largely undisputed and follow up research was not conducted.
Such studies and efforts ultimately led to changes in the medical profession. In
1996, in what is now a well-known address, the president of the American Pain
Society argued that pain should be deemed the fifth vital sign. The society
subsequently developed algorithms for assessing pain to be included as part of vital
sign assessments. By 1999, the Joint Commission issued standards requiring health
care organizations to improve pain management and required vigorous treatment of
pain.26 In 2004, the Federation of State Medical Boards recommended that state
boards consider punishment for under-treatment of pain. Physician thought-leaders
regularly lectured that only 1 percent of the population was at risk for addiction.27
Yet despite this attention, all pain, and especially chronic pain, has remained
notoriously difficult to treat. Finding appropriate therapies for pain requires
understanding the various complex neural circuits involved in different types of pain,
much of which is now better—but still incompletely—understood.28 Nearly half of
all dispensed opioid prescriptions in 2012 were prescribed by primary care

22 David W. Baker, The Joint Commission’s Pain Standards: Origins and Evolution (May 5, 2017),
https://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/Pain_Std_History_Web_Version_05122017.pdf.
[https://
perma.cc/F8Z4-37B2].
23 Sarpatwari et al., supra note 4, at 465 (citing Marilee Donovan et al., Incidence and
Characteristics of Pain in a Sample of Medical–Surgical Inpatients, 30 PAIN 69, 71, 73 (1987)).
24 Jane Porter & Hershel Jick, Addiction Rare in Patients Treated with Narcotics, 302 NEJM 123
(1980); see also Pamela TM Leung et al., A 1980 Letter on the Risk of Opioid Addiction, 376 NEJM 2194
(2017).
25 R.K. Portenoy & K.M. Foley, Chronic Use of Opioid Analgesics in Non-malignant Pain: Report
of 38 Cases, 25 PAIN 171 (1986).
26

Baker, supra note 22, at 3–4.

27

Thomas Catan & Evan Perez, A Pain-Drug Champion Has Second Thoughts, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
17, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324478304578173342657044604?mg=
prod/accounts-wsj.
28 Id.; Hance Clarke et al., The Prevention of Chronic Postsurgical Pain using Gabapentin and
Pregabalin: A Combined Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 115 PAIN MEDICINE 428 (2012).
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physicians, most of whom have only basic education in the details of pain
management.29 There are also insufficient numbers of pain specialists, meaning that
other physicians may be unable to connect with a specialist in providing care.

2. Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing
Not only is pain difficult to understand and treat, it is widespread. Millions of
Americans suffer from the burden of pain.30 Pain poses a significant social and
economic burden in the U.S., costing an estimated $635 billion in treatment and
management of pain alone,31 not including the substantial economic costs from
diminished work productivity for both pain sufferers and their families and other
caregivers. This has led to an enormous market for pain management therapies,
estimated at $36.1 billion in 2017 with the expectation that it could grow to $52.0
billion by 2022,32 which has been long recognized by the pharmaceutical industry.
The pharmaceutical industry spends tens of billions of dollars per year on
marketing in an effort to influence prescriber and patient behaviors, and marketing
methods have become increasingly sophisticated over the years.33 Such methods
include setting up face to face meetings between health care providers and
pharmaceutical sales representatives (detailing); providing health care providers with
samples34; paying “thought leaders” for presentations at educational and professional
meetings; funding Continuing Medical Education programs. All of these strategies
have been demonstrated highly effective at increasing prescribing of the advertised
drug. Approximately $4 billion per year is spent on direct-to-consumer (DTC)
advertising, which has been shown to lead exposed patients to ask for the advertised
drug by name, which in turn makes physicians more likely to prescribe it.35 In recent
29

NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 57.

30

The 2011 Institute of Medicine (IOM) Report, Relieving Pain in America, estimated that as many
as 100 million Americans suffer from chronic pain. See INST. OF MEDICINE, RELIEVING PAIN IN AMERICA:
A BLUEPRINT FOR TRANSFORMING PREVENTION, CARE, EDUCATION, AND RESEARCH (2011) [hereinafter
2011 IOM REPORT]. While that estimate is probably too high, see NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 50,
chronic pain is unquestionably one of the most common and intractable medical problems facing
Americans today.
31 2011 IOM REPORT, supra note 30; Wayne Winegarden, Estimating the Net Economic Benefit of
Abuse-Deterrent Opioids, ECONO STATS (March 2015), http://econostats.org/estimating-the-neteconomicbenefit-of-abuse-deterrent-opioids.
32 BCC RESEARCH, THE GLOBAL MARKET FOR PAIN MANAGEMENT DRUGS AND DEVICES (Aug.
2017), https://www.bccresearch.com/market-research/healthcare/the-global-market-for-pain-managementdrugs-and-devices-hlc026f.html.
33 Persuading the Prescribers: Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing and its Influence on Physicians
and Patients, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/fact-sheets/2013/11/11/persuading-the-prescribers-pharmaceutical-industry-marketing-and-itsinfluence-on-physicians-and-patients.
34
35

Id. at 2.

Ed Silverman, All That Pharmaceutical Advertising May be a ‘Mixed Bag,’ After All, STAT
(Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/09/13/direct-to-consumer-drug-ads/. This is
not to say that DTC advertising’s public health effects are all negative. For example, DTC advertising can
be used to promote awareness of new drugs and their risks. See, e.g., Elizabeth Almasi et. al, What are the
Public Health Effects of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising? 3 PLOS MEDICINE e145 (2006). FDA is
currently studying the effect of such advertising on the public, although it is not studying that effect
specifically in the context of opioids. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Office of Prescription Drug
Promotion (OPDP) Research, https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProducts
andTobacco/CDER/ucm090276.htm#research.
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years, large pharmaceutical manufacturers have reduced early-pipeline internal
research and development in favor of purchasing intellectual property from small
biotech companies after they have established proof of concept and completed some
clinical trials. The large companies then handle the later-phase trials required for
approvals, and focus resources on sales and marketing.
Against this backdrop of an increased focus on marketing rather than research and
development, opioids can be an especially attractive product because most opioids
now entering the market involve tweaks on the existing technology and do not
require extensive R&D, while offering a large potential market of patients.36 Indeed,
as professional organizations encouraged physicians to focus on pain assessment and
management beginning in the 1990s, opioid manufacturers actively helped
physicians meet these new standards. Until public health experts recently began
sounding the alarm about increasing addiction and FDA began holding stakeholder
meetings to discuss opioid misuse, manufacturers engaged in aggressive marketing
of opioids. Purdue Pharma (Purdue) probably provides the most notorious example,
although it was by no means alone. When Purdue introduced its extended-release
oxycodone product (OxyContin) in 1995, it was the first formulation of oxycodone
with an approved dosing schedule of every 12 hours rather than every 4 to 6 hours. It
was indicated “for the management of moderate to severe pain where use of an
opioid analgesic is appropriate for more than a few days.”37 Sales of OxyContin grew
from $44 million (316,000 prescriptions) in 1996 to over $1 billion in 2000, with
combined sales of almost $3 billion in 2001-2002 (14 million prescriptions).38 This
was the result of a systematic and comprehensive marketing scheme.39 In that period,
Purdue held more than 40 all-expense paid conferences for more than 5000
physicians, pharmacists, and nurses. Purdue doubled its sales force, gave significant
bonuses to sales representatives, and actively engaged the highest prescribers. In
addition, Purdue greatly expanded its market by promoting Oxycontin for non-cancer
related pain. Oxycontin prescriptions for non-cancer-related pain expanded from
670,000 in 1997 to 6.2 million in 2002.40 Throughout that time, Purdue’s
promotional materials argued that the risk of addiction was tiny.41 Purdue, and three
of its executives, ultimately pleaded guilty to criminal charges related to the
misleading promotion of OxyContin in 2007.
Although FDA monitors and regulates prescription drug advertising, examples of
troubling marketing of opioids and related products have continued to arise. For
example, in 2016 the Department of Justice (DOJ) charged two former

36 Most research and development in the opioid market is focused abuse deterrent formulations
(ADF). See Report: Opioid Pain Sales to $18.4B in the U.S. by 2020, CENTERWATCH (July 17, 2017),
https://www.centerwatch.com/news-online/2017/07/17/report-opioid-pain-sales-hit-18-4b-u-s-2020
[https://perma.cc/3UGK-4866].
37 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-110, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: OXYCONTIN ABUSE
AND DIVERSION AND EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM 35 (2003).
38 Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health
Tragedy, 99 J. AM PUBLIC HEALTH 221, 223 (2009).
39

Id. at 221.

40

Id. at 223

41

Id. OxyContin’s original label approved in 1996 stated that “Delayed absorption, as provided by
OxyContin tables, is believed to reduce the abuse liability of the drug.” See, e.g., $635 Million Settlement
Resolves Oxycontin Charges, 15 NO. 4 FDA ADVERT. & PROMOTION MANUAL NEWSLETTER 2.
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pharmaceutical sales representatives with fraudulently using educational programs to
promote sales of fentanyl sublingual spray (Subsys). The complaint alleged that
physicians were compensated for providing educational presentations to healthcare
professionals, but that the programs were pretense for social gatherings at expensive
restaurants.42 As another example, one of the most notorious advertisements aired
during the 2017 Super Bowl was an advertisement was for naloxegol (Movantik), a
drug indicated for opioid-induced constipation. Although the drug was not an opioid,
critics noted that the advertisement sought to normalize use of opioids for chronic
pain.43
Marketing practices have also harnessed the power of patient advocacy groups. As
these groups have proliferated in recent years, drug manufacturers can influence
them by providing grant funding, which may garner endorsements for the
manufacturers’ positions.44 Reuters reported that opioid manufacturers gave money
to 45 of 158 patient advocacy and professional organizations that commented on the
CDC’s 2015 proposed guidelines on prescribing opioids for chronic pain.
Organizations that had received funding from opioid manufacturers were more likely
to oppose the guidelines.45
Pharmaceutical industry marketing and patient advocacy (some funded by the
industry) were two leading factors that changed the culture around opioid prescribing
and contributed to the explosion in use of opioids over the last few decades. These
opioid use trends, in turn, revealed the substantial potential for misuse and overdose.
In 2016, forty percent of all opioid related deaths in the U.S., roughly 16,000 people,
were due to prescription opioids.46 An estimated two million people misuse or are
dependent on prescription opioids.47 Many of the individuals who have moved on to
stronger illicit drugs like heroin and fentanyl began by misusing prescription opioids.

42

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Pharmaceutical Company Employees Arrested for
Participating in Fentanyl Kickback Scheme (June 9, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/formerpharmaceutical-company-employees-arrested-participating-fentanyl-kickback-scheme [https://perma.cc/
4CP9-HW4W].
43 Ahiza Garcia, Super Bowl Drug Ad Spurs Big Backlash, CNN (Feb. 12, 2016),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/02/11/news/super-bowl-painkiller-constipation-ad/index.html [https://perma.
cc/4Z2U-4D7T].
44 C. Wick et al., The Characteristics of Unsolicited Clinical Oncology Literature Provided by
Pharmaceutical Industry, 18 ANNALS OF ONCOLOGY 1580 (2007).
45 Ronnie Cohen, Industry Money May Taint Advice from Patient Groups, Regulators, REUTERS
(Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-patients-advocacy-conflicts/industry-moneymay-taint-advice-from-patient-groups-regulators-idUSKBN1512ZG.
[https://perma.cc/4BNA-FXNY].
Reuters also reported that United Therapeutics Corp. is paying $210 million to settle claims that it used a
patient-assistance charity to illegally pay Medicare patients’ expenses for its blood pressure medications,
thereby increasing its sales. This settlement is the first to come out of a broader investigation by the
government into the financial relationships between various pharmaceutical manufacturers and patient
groups. See Nate Raymond, United Therapeutics to Pay $210 Million to Resolve U.S. Kickback Probe,
REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-utd-therapeut-settlement/unitedtherapeutics-to-pay-210-million-to-resolve-u-s-kickback-probe-idUSKBN1EE24U
[https://perma.cc/NJY7-EG5K].
46

CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Prescription Opioid Overdose Data (2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/overdose.html [https://perma.cc/JVP7-E543].
47 DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
ADMIN., CTR FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH STATISTICS AND QUALITY, NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE
AND HEALTH (2014), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-FRR1-2014/NSDUHFRR1-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6GN-PPZL].
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The social cost of opioid misuse and dependence is nearly eighty billion dollars
annually.48 In short, the patient advocates who argued for better treatment of pain in
the 1980s and 1990s were not wrong about the need to do so, but the fact that such
advocacy led to the prescribing of more opioids became its own problem.49

B. Applying FDA’s Regulatory Process to Opioids
FDA oversight of prescription drugs covers the human clinical trials necessary to
support approval and continues through the approval decision and the monitoring of
drugs after they are marketed. Despite this regulation, one reason there has been little
evidence of the comprehensive safety and effectiveness of opioids, particularly in the
context of indirect effects, addiction, and third-party misuse, is that, as explained in
this section, FDA’s traditional, drug-specific regulatory scheme generally has not
required such study.50

1. The Approval Process
The approval process for opioids has generally been the same as that for other new
drugs.51 FDA’s approval process focuses on a particular drug’s safety and efficacy as
demonstrated in the setting of its clinical trials. In most situations, it does not factor
in the practice of medicine or patient behavior. To initiate clinical investigation of a
new compound, a drug sponsor must file an Investigational New Drug Application
(IND) in which the sponsor lays out its general investigative plan, its projected
clinical protocols as well as information about the drug’s chemistry, pharmacology,
and toxicology.52 The investigative plan lays out the anticipated types of clinical
trials that will be conducted, the number and characteristics of the participants in the
clinical trials and any foreseeable risks to participants based on the drug’s
toxicology.
For approval, the FDCA requires that drugs be shown to have benefits that
outweigh their risks.53 A drug’s efficacy is demonstrated by showing “substantial
evidence” of its effects under the conditions of use prescribed. Clinical benefit is
subject to the intended use of the drug; it may mean an improvement in symptoms,

48 Sarpatwari et al., supra note 4, at 464 (citing Curtis s. Florence et al., The Economic Burden of
Prescription Opioid Overdose, Abuse and Dependence in the United States, 2013, 54 MED. CARE 901,
901 (2016)).
49

NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 51.

50

Cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM.
TECH. L. REV. 345, 347–48 (2007) (describing how FDA approval incentivizes research).
51 Because some opioids have been on the market since before the Kefauver-Harris Amendments of
1962, and the FDCA itself, were enacted, certain drugs were subject to the Drug Efficacy Study
Implementation (DESI) review rather than the modern drug approval process. However, like the modern
drug approval process, the DESI review was focused on effectiveness for individual patients in the context
of the drug’s labeling, not on indirect effects. Much of the DESI review of opioids was not completed
until the 1980s. See, e.g., NAS Report, supra note 6, at 359–60; Peter Barton Hutt & Robert Temple,
Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Drug Amendments of 1962, 68 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 449, 454
(2013); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Background Document, Pediatric Advisory Committee Meeting,
Benefit/Risk Assessment of Prescription Opioid Antitussive Products for Treatment of Cough in Pediatric
Patients (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeeting
Materials/PediatricAdvisoryCommittee/UCM575013.pdf.
52

21 C.F.R. § 312.23.
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21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
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an improved mode of delivery or an improved side-effect profile as compared to no
therapy (often a placebo) or a known effective therapy. Safety is measured within the
studied cohort. Superiority is not required. FDA prefers two “adequate and wellcontrolled investigations” of a drug’s efficacy, but the FDCA was changed in 1997
to permit FDA to grant approval on the basis of only one such investigation with
additional supporting evidence.54 About one-third of drugs are now approved on the
basis of a single pivotal trial.55
Because clinical trials often represent the greatest expense in the drug approval
process for drug sponsors, sponsors are incentivized to eliminate as much human
variability as possible in the clinical trial process. This means that there can be major
differences between the study population and the population that ultimately uses the
drug after it is approved. For example, in the case of the extended-release
hydrocodone (Zohydro) approved in 2013, the clinical trial that supported the drug’s
approval was limited to patients with lower back pain. No trials involving other
patients who might use the drug for pain, such as patients with cancer or arthritis
were required.56 In addition, to further reduce the potential for human variability,
opioid drug sponsors have used a controversial trial design called “enriched
enrollment randomized withdrawal” (EERW). That method screens out patients who
are non-responsive or suffer adverse effects so that they do not confound efficacy
data. Critics, however, argue that the methodology further reinforces the disconnect
between the clinical trials supporting regulatory approval and clinical practice in the
real world.57
In addition, most opioids approved in recent decades have not been subject to the
full clinical trial process required for novel drugs because they are reformulations of
existing drugs. They have therefore been approved via an abbreviated pathway that
relies heavily on the safety and efficacy data about the existing product.58 Clinical
trials are required to bridge any differences between the products or to address any
new safety signals that may arise.59 But those clinical trials are typically of a short
duration that does not reflect how long opioids are frequently prescribed in clinical
practice.

2. Post-Approval Monitoring
FDA continues to monitor and evaluate the safety and effectiveness of new drugs
once they are approved and marketed. This is because some risks may not be
apparent until after larger and more heterogenous populations have used the drug.
Likewise, some risks may become apparent when a drug has been used for a duration

54 Id.; see also The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA), Pub. L.
No. 105-115 § 115, 11 Stat. 2296, 2313.
55 Nicholas S. Downing et al., Clinical Trial Evidence Supporting FDA Approval of Novel
Therapeutic Agents, 2005–2012, 311 JAMA 368 (2014).
56 NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 364; FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND
RESEARCH, Summary Review [of Zohydro ER] (Oct. 25, 2013), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
drugsatfda_docs/label/2013/202880Orig1s000SumR.pdf [https://perma.cc/NV69-AEXZ].
57 Jonah Campbell & Nicholas King, “Unsettling Circularity”: Clinical Trial Enrichment and the
Evidentiary Politics of Chronic Pain, 12 BIOSOCIETIES 191 (2017).
58

21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2).

59

21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50, 314.54.
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longer than that of the clinical trials supporting approval (two-thirds of drugs are
approved based on trials lasting six months or shorter).
One primary way that FDA monitors marketed drugs is through adverse event
reporting. FDA maintains a database, FDA’s Adverse Event Reporting System
(FAERS), that contains submitted adverse event reports relating to FDA regulated
drugs and biologics.60 Drug manufacturers are subject to various reporting
obligations, including providing FDA with serious and unexpected adverse event
reports within fifteen days.61 But reports that come to FAERS from health care
providers, lawyers, and patients, rather than manufacturers, are made voluntarily.
Best estimates are that only 10 percent of adverse events are actually reported to
FAERS.62
To address some of these weaknesses of FAERS, in 2007 Congress authorized
FDA to create an active postmarket surveillance system, known as Sentinel. FDA
launched Sentinel to better monitor postmarket safety issues with drugs in 2014.
Sentinel gathers and analyzes data provided by participating organizations, including
some of the nation’s largest health insurers, disease registries as well as many
hospitals. Although Sentinel should help FDA address some of the shortcomings of
relying only on the information in FAERS, its ability to use its available data to
accurately assess a drug’s risk is still subject to major challenges.63
Beyond these general challenges of monitoring the safety and effectiveness of
marketed drugs, adverse events relating to misuse of opioids are particularly
challenging to observe because physicians or patients may have incentives to conceal
them.64 For example, patients may not report some psychological effects relating to
opioids. Because of stigma or fear of criminal prosecution, there may be reluctance
to report issues relating to substance misuse. In addition, in many contexts of misuse,
it is difficult to know which drug caused the adverse event. There are many different
surveillance networks for drug misuse at the national and state level.65 The
Researched Abuse, Diversion and Addiction-Related Surveillance System
(RADARS) and the National Addictions Vigilance Intervention and Prevention
Program (NAVIPPRO) are two that provide postmarketing surveillance data to the
pharmaceutical industry. But those systems do not provide the product-level
information that had been provided by the Drug Abuse Warning Network
(DAWN).66 That data allowed comparison of the impacts, mortality and morbidity

60 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Questions and Answers on FDA’s Adverse Event Reporting System
(FAERS), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/surveillance/adversedrug
effects [https://perma.cc/2CM5-ZQJ7].
61 21 C.F.R. § 314.80; Steven Findlay, Health Policy Brief: The FDA’s Sentinel Initiative, HEALTH
AFFAIRS (June 4, 2015), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=139.
[https://perma.cc/8SPG-XRKE]. Other reporting requirements include that manufacturers must report nonserious or expected adverse events on a quarterly basis for the first three years after a drug is approved,
and then annually thereafter. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.90.
62

Findlay, supra note 61, at 2.
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Richard C. Dart, Monitoring Risk: Post marketing Surveillance and Signal Detection, 105S DRUG
(2009).
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trends, of specific products. Such data would likely be useful for FDA in developing
postmarket risk mitigation strategies. The DAWN networks were defunded in 2011.
FDA has the authority to require postmarketing studies if there is some evidence
or signal of “serious risk.”67 The FDCA directs FDA to conduct regular screenings of
the FAERS database to identify such risks, and through this process, FDA has
identified drugs that may warrant further regulatory action or investigation. Although
FDA has rarely used its authority to require additional studies based on such
information, opioids are one such instance in which the agency has required
postapproval research.68 However, FDA has limited authority to ensure that
postmarket study commitments, in general, are completed.69 In the specific context
of opioids, FDA may be further hampered by a lack of product-specific information.
In addition to requiring studies and trials, FDA has the authority to require special
risk mitigation programs, known as Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies
(REMS). The agency has required REMS for almost all opioids, and has recently
expanded the demands of those requirements. But even these broader REMS
requirements do not address the need for further systematic study and research to
fully understand the relationships between specific opioids’ uses and misuses.70 A
recent meta-analysis of available studies on long-term opioid treatment found very
few studies that extended for more than six weeks, and that methodologies and
definitions varied widely.71 The study found limited evidence on the effectiveness of
varying opioid dosing strategies, and limited date on the effectiveness of risk
assessment modalities for predicting potential abuse or misuse. The authors
expressed an urgent need for well-designed studies to answer some of these
questions.72 Whether through pre-approval studies, postapproval surveillance, or
other safety-related tools like REMS, FDA has not yet systematically used its
authorities to require and assess comprehensive data on the indirect, public health
impacts of opioids.
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21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3).
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See, e.g., Letter from Bob A. Rappaport, Director, Division of Anesthesia and Analgesia
Products, CDER, FDA, to Craig Landau, CMO & VP Clinical, Medical & Regulatory Affairs, Purdue
Pharma L.P. (Apr. 5, 2010) (describing postmarket requirements for Oxycontin),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2010/022272s000ltr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RKE8-5W7H]. For a database of all required postmarket studies, see FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., Postmarket Requirements and Commitments, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/
pmc/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/S579-UNL5].
69 Findlay, supra note 61, at 3; Kevin Fain et al., The Food and Drug Administration Amendments
Act and Postmarketing Commitments, 310 JAMA 202, 202–03 (2013); see also Alison M. Pease et al.,
Postapproval Studies of Drugs Initially Approved by the FDA on the Basis of Limited Evidence:
Systematic Review, 357 BRITISH MED. J. 1680 (2017).
70 Until recently, FDA required REMS only for extended release/long acting opioids, which have
higher risks for abuse because of their higher potency. But FDA moved to extend those requirements to
immediate release opioids, still the most commonly prescribed class of opioids, in September 2017. See
Scott Gottlieb, FDA Takes Important Steps to Stem the Tide of Opioid Misuse and Abuse, FDA VOICE
(Sept. 28, 2017), https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2017/09/fda-takes-important-steps-to-stem-thetide-of-opioid-misuse-and-abuse.
71 Roger Chou et al., The Effectiveness and Risks of Long-Term Opioid Therapy for Chronic Pain:
A Systematic Review for a National Institutes of Health Pathways to Prevention Workshop, 162 ANNALS
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C. The Role of DEA
Because opioids are controlled substances,73 FDA is not the only federal regulator
that oversees the opioid market, which further complicates the regulatory landscape.
Since 1973, FDA has shared jurisdiction over the regulation of opioids and other
controlled substances with DEA. DEA was created to add intensified law
enforcement mechanisms to the federal response to drug misuse pursuant to the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA).74 The CSA establishes a statutory framework for
the regulation of production, possession, and distribution of controlled substances,
defined as any drug or substance (excluding alcohol products) that has potential for
abuse. Opioids have been treated as controlled substances and subject to some sort of
scheduling since the advent of federal regulation in the 1920s. DEA licenses
controlled substance manufacturers, sets supply quotas for the drugs, regulates
prescribers and dispensing pharmacies, and prosecutes illicit or illegal use or
production.
Under the CSA, FDA and DEA share responsibility for determining scheduling of
controlled substances. Scheduling is intended to balance the need to limit supply of
potentially addicting drugs while at the same time permitting sufficient supply for
medicinal and research use.75 The five schedules for drugs covered by the CSA are
designed to provide a structure that would be responsive to the nuanced requirements
of perceived danger, medical utility, and potential for abuse.76 Scheduling status
affects prescribing power (e.g. manner of prescribing and limits on refills), triggers
requirements for supply chain record keeping, and determines the degree of criminal
punishment for illicit trafficking. While all five schedules impose controls, the most
significant controls are imposed on Schedule I substances (extremely limited use)
and Schedule II substances. Indeed, in practice, scheduling can have a profound
effect on the therapeutic use of a drug, but it functions as a very blunt instrument.
Many physicians refuse to prescribe schedule II drugs. Since many opioids are
scheduled or being rescheduled into schedule II, this should reduce opioid
prescribing but it may also limit access for patients who need them.77
To make decisions about whether to schedule a drug and, if so, at what level, the
CSA requires FDA and DEA to consider eight factors: (1) the drug’s actual or
potential for abuse, (2) scientific evidence of the drug’s pharmacologic effect, (3) the
state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug, (4) the drug’s history and
current pattern of abuse, (5) the scope, duration and significance of abuse, (6) risk to
public health, (7) the drug’s psychic or physiologic dependence liability and (8)
whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already controlled

73 See, e.g., DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, List of
https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules [https://perma.cc/63VD-242V].
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21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904.
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See, e.g., John A. Gilbert, Jr., DEA Regulation of Controlled Substances and Listed Chemicals,
65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 623, 624 (2010). For a detailed discussion of how FDA and DEA work together on
scheduling decisions, including difficulties that may arise in the process, see, e.g., Lars Noah, Challenges
in the Federal Regulation of Pain Management Technologies, 31 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 55 (2003).
76 Joseph F. Spillane, Debating the Controlled Substances Act, 76 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE
17, 21–22 (2004).
77 See Noah, Challenges in the Federal Regulation of Pain Management Technologies, supra note
75, at 62–63.
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under the CSA.78 Some of this data, such as the scientific evidence of the drug’s
pharmacologic effect, is readily accessible through FDA’s approval process. But
much of the data cannot be available until there is broad experience with the drug.
Moreover, given the paucity of research about long-term use of many opioids, many
scheduling decisions are made in a way that appears data-driven but are in reality
based on limited data and anecdotal evidence or intuition.
Although DEA has an important role to play in responding to the opioid
epidemic,79 the focus of DEA’s mission is one of law enforcement, rather than public
health. Because of the complicated nature of the opioid crisis, including its
intersection with pain management and prescriber and patient behaviors, it is critical
that the regulatory response to the crisis include public health expertise.80 FDA, in
contrast to DEA, has a public health mission, the institutional expertise in assessing a
drug’s safety and effectiveness within the context of that mission, and the
gatekeeping authority over prescription opioids. Accordingly, this Article focuses on
FDA’s application of its legal authority to opioids, with subsequent consideration of
other drugs that raise similar population health concerns.

II. FDA’S LEGAL AUTHORITY TO TAKE A BROAD
REGULATORY PERSPECTIVE
The current opioid epidemic has arisen over the course of many years, and as a
result of many complex factors.81 Adequately addressing the problem will take a
sustained effort on the part of many regulators and stakeholders, and no one action
by FDA, alone, will be sufficient.82 But there may be ways to improve FDA’s
regulatory approach for opioids and other drugs with externalities—such as by
ensuring that the agency incorporates population health information, including
provider and patient behaviors, into its approval and withdrawal decisions in a
systematic way.
For many of its drug-related regulatory decisions, FDA’s authority to take this
broader, public health perspective on the evidence relevant to those decisions is
expressly granted in the FDCA. For example, FDA may require a REMS when
necessary to ensure that a drug’s benefits outweigh its risks.83 In conducting that
benefit-risk analysis, the statute explicitly contemplates the agency considering uses
and impacts beyond those described in the labeling. In requiring a REMS, FDA is to
consider, among other things, “any known or potential adverse events,” including the
risks of misuse and overdose from patients using the drug in ways not in the labeled
instructions.84 Additionally, for REMS with elements to assure safe use—the most
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restrictive types of REMS—the agency must not only evaluate the benefits and risks
of the drug, but also the impact of the REMS requirements on patient access and the
health care delivery system.85
Yet, because the baseline drug approval language in the FDCA is not parallel in
its express wording,86 FDA’s approval decisions have been interpreted as “drugspecific”—needing to be focused on the benefits and risks and the use of the drug as
described in the labeling. We argue that such a conception of FDA’s authority is too
narrow, and that a broader, “public health” approach can be observed in past FDA
decisions regarding approval or withdrawal. This Part first describes FDA’s practice
of taking a public health approach in its drug approval and withdrawal decisions,
providing examples of when FDA has done so, and then describes the legal authority
permitting that approach.

A. The Public Health Regulatory Perspective in Practice
The FDCA authorizes FDA to approve a drug when the drug is shown to be
efficacious and safe enough “under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or
suggested in the proposed labeling.”87 As FDA recently explained in a memorandum,
“[t]he separate weighing of benefit and risk for each intended use is critical” because
evidence supporting safety and efficacy in one “setting” does not necessarily indicate
that the same product is safe and efficacious in another setting.88
But the fact that a drug’s benefit-risk profile may be different in different settings
does not mean that FDA must ignore the realities of how particular drugs are used, or
likely to be used, in ways that deviate from the approved labeling and affect other
patients or the public health.89 Indeed, FDA has recognized that the kinds of
evidence necessary to determine safety and efficacy vary across drugs. Since at least
1985, the agency’s regulations regarding approvals of new drug applications (NDAs)
and abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs, for generics) have explained:
While the statutory standards apply to all drugs, the many kinds of drugs that are
subject to the statutory standards and the wide range of uses for those drugs demand
flexibility in applying the standards. Thus, FDA is required to exercise its scientific
judgment to determine the kind and quantity of data and information an applicant is
required to provide for a particular drug to meet the statutory standards.90
Similarly, for opioids and other drugs with the potential for misuse, since at least
1985, FDA regulations have required that NDAs include “studies or information
85
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If FDA determines that an approved drug no longer satisfies the standard for approval, the agency
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87 21 U.S.C. § 355(d); see also Am. Pharm. Ass’n v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1054, 1055 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (McGowan, J., concurring) (arguing, based on 21 U.S.C. § 355(d), that “methadone is safe for its
intended use notwithstanding the possibility that it will be employed in unintended fashions”).
88 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MEMORANDUM: PUBLIC HEALTH INTERESTS AND FIRST AMENDMENT
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related to abuse of the drug,” in recognition of the risks to individual patients and
their communities associated with such drugs.91 FDA has implemented this
regulatory language by taking a broad perspective on the evidence relevant to its
benefit-risk determinations for approvals and withdrawals (or analogous decisions)
for drugs subject to misuse and drugs with other kinds of clinical externalities.92
One example of FDA incorporating population health information into its
assessments of drugs of misuse comes from OxyContin, which was originally
approved for moderate to severe pain when continuous, around-the-clock treatment
was needed.93 In 2010, after FDA approved an abuse-deterrent formulation of
OxyContin, Purdue, the drug’s manufacturer, took the original formulation off the
market.94 FDA was then faced with the possibility of generic manufacturers seeking
approval for their formulations. Before a generic equivalent of a no-longer-marketed
brand-name drug may be approved, FDA must determine whether the brand-name
drug was withdrawn for reasons of safety or effectiveness, and this determination is,
essentially, based on the same criteria that FDA uses to approve or withdraw
approval of applications.95 In this case, FDA concluded that the brand-name was
withdrawn from the market for reasons of safety or effectiveness, a determination
that was made based on widespread patient misuse of that non-abuse-deterrent
formulation. FDA’s finding “that the benefits of original OxyContin no longer
outweigh its risks” provides an example of the agency incorporating non-labelingrelated patient experiences into its benefit-risk determination process.96
As another example, in June 2017, FDA asked Endo Pharmaceuticals to stop
marketing its extended-released oxymorphone product, Opana ER, “due to the public
health consequences of abuse,” and explained that if Endo Pharmaceuticals declined
to voluntarily withdraw Opana from the market, FDA would “take steps to formally
91 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(vii), 50 Fed. Reg. 7452 (Feb. 22, 1985); see also NAS REPORT, supra
note 6, at 381 (“For drugs with the potential for misuse, for example, NDAs must include ‘studies or
information related to abuse of the drug,’ which, of course, is not information about the use of the drug as
directed in the proposed labeling.”).
92 See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 380–85; Gottlieb and Woodcock, supra note 7; Peter
Lurie, Associate Commissioner, FDA, Integrating the Broader Public Health Consequences of Opioid
Abuse and Misuse into the Evaluation of New Opioid Products (Nov. 4, 2016),
http://www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/~/media/Files/Activity%20Files/PublicHealth/PainResearch/LUR
IE2.pdf [https://perma.cc/T299-QM2L] [hereinafter Lurie Presentation]; see also 82 Fed. Reg. 45,597,
45,599 (Sept. 29, 2017) (soliciting comment on what “public health considerations” should be
incorporated into FDA’s benefit-risk assessment of opioids).
93

78 Fed. Reg. 23,273 (Apr. 18, 2013) [hereinafter OxyContin Notice].

94

Id.

95

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(C); see also OxyContin Notice, supra note 93, at 23,274 (“FDA
concludes that the benefits of original OxyContin no longer outweigh its risks.”). But see DONALD. O.
BEERS & KURT R. KARST, GENERIC AND INNOVATOR DRUGS: A GUIDE TO FDA APPROVAL
REQUIREMENTS § 3.02[B] (8th ed., 2017) (“How FDA is supposed to determine whether a drug has been
withdrawn from sale for safety or effectiveness reasons is not spelled out in the statute.”).
96 OxyContin Notice, supra note 93, at 23,274. FDA’s decision on OxyContin did not amount to a
decision that all non-abuse deterrent formulations were no longer safe and effective. For example, shortly
after the agency published its determination that original OxyContin was removed from the market for
safety and effectiveness reasons, the agency determined that original Opana ER (oxymorphone), which
also lacked an abuse deterrent formulation, was not removed from the market for safety and effectiveness
reasons after the newer abuse deterrent formulation was approved. The agency distinguished reformulated
Opana ER from reformulated OxyContin based on data suggesting that reformulated Opana, unlike
OxyContin, could still be easily crushed and snorted. See 78 Fed. Reg. 38,053 (June 25, 2013).
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require its removal by withdrawing approval.”97 Opana was first approved in 2006,
and then reformulated in 2012.98 The reformulated version, while intended to be
more resistant to manipulation for misuse, proved to still be easy to inject, and the
injection of the drug was linked to an HIV and HCV outbreak in Indiana.99 Although
FDA has not, as of yet, officially withdrawn approval of reformulated Opana,100
Endo Pharmaceuticals voluntarily stopped marketing the drug in July 2017, and
FDA’s request that Endo do so represents the agency incorporating non-labelingrelated patient experiences into its drug evaluations.101
In certain instances, the agency has also incorporated a public health perspective
into its assessments of drugs that are not controlled substances associated with
misuse. For example, in its benefit-risk assessment of antibiotics for both animal and
human use, the agency has long considered the risk that inappropriate use will lead to
greater antibiotic resistance.102 Resistance can render antibiotics ineffective, and all
uses of antibiotics, including appropriate uses, contribute to the development of
resistance by killing the bacteria that are not resistant.103 But inappropriate uses—
such as use in animals for growth promotion rather than for treating infection, use in
patients who do not have signs of a bacterial infection, or use in patients who fail to
complete a full course of treatment to eradicate the entire infection—contribute to
the rise of resistance without offering commensurate health benefits.104 Actions that
97 See Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Requests Removal of Opana ER for Risks Related
to Abuse (June 8, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm
562401.htm. [https://perma.cc/ZE22-3VQF].
98

See id.

99

See id.; see also FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SUMMARY MINUTES OF THE DRUG SAFETY AND RISK
MANAGEMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND ANESTHETIC AND ANALGESIC DRUG PRODUCTS ADVISORY
COMMITTEE JOINT MEETING (Mar. 13–14, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/
CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Drugs/AnestheticAndAnalgesicDrugProductsAdvisoryCommittee/UCM551
226.pdf. [https://perma.cc/75G7-ESFW].
100 Nor, as of the time of writing, has FDA determined that reformulated Opana was withdrawn from
the market for reasons of safety or effectiveness. But given FDA’s June 2017 request, it seems likely FDA
would make such a determination should a company seek to market a generic version of the drug.
101 Moreover, there are signs that the agency may take a similar approach for other opioid products
in the future. For example, in November 2017 FDA sent a complete response letter to Pharmaceutical
Manufacturing Research Services (PMRS) declining to approve the company’s immediate release
oxycodone product. After PMRS requested an opportunity for a hearing pursuant to 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.110(b)(3), FDA published a Federal Register Notice explaining that it declined to approve the drug
for various reasons, including that “the data submitted were not sufficient to rule out the possibility that
the proposed formulation could result in a greater proportion of abuse by injection of PMRS’s product
compared to a conventional IR oxycodone formulation.” Although, as of the time of writing it is not clear
whether FDA ultimately will refuse to approve the drug, the agency’s reasoning appears similar to that it
applied to Opana. 83 Fed. Reg. 6196, 6197 (Feb. 13, 2018).
102 See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 6, 383–84; see also Aaron S. Kesselheim & Kevin Outterson,
Improving Antibiotic Markets for Long Term Sustainability, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 101,
113–14 (2011) (describing the ways patient and provider behaviors contribute to resistance). Although the
agency’s statutory authority for regulating animal drugs differs in some ways from human drugs, the
approval standard for animal drugs similarly describes the safety and effectiveness of the drugs “under the
conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof.” 21 U.S.C.
§ 360b(d)(1)(A).
103 See Brad Spellberg et al., The Future of Antibiotics and Resistance, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 299,
299–300 (2013).
104 See,

Certain

e.g., Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 102, at 114; FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Phasing Out
Antibiotic Use in Farm Animals (2013), https://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/
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the agency has taken based on this risk included attempting, ultimately
unsuccessfully, to withdraw approval of certain animal antibiotics used for growth
promotion, issuing guidance on mitigating the risks of resistance associated with
antibiotic use in animals, and requiring language in the labeling for antibiotics
intended for human use to encourage judicious prescribing.105
There are other examples in which FDA incorporates a broad range of evidence
into certain approval and withdrawal decisions. These include considering the herd
immunity benefits of vaccines106; FDA’s decision to withdraw approval of certain
acetaminophen-containing prescription drugs based in part on the risk of liver
damage when patients do no use the products as directed107; and certain
considerations for over-the-counter drug approvals, such as studies of their actual,
rather than intended, use.108

B. Interpreting the Statutory Standard for Approval
Although FDA in some instances has incorporated broader, population-level
information into its assessments of the safety and efficacy of drugs “under the
conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling,”109 it
has not clearly described its authority to do so either in the preambles to its

ConsumerUpdates/ucm378100.htm [https://perma.cc/J76D-KFB6]; see also CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2013),
http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/threat-report-2013/pdf/ar-threats-2013-508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
K8C4-GW22] (finding that up to fifty percent of antibiotics used in the United States are used
inappropriately).
105 See,

e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at, 383–84.

106 In

addition to conferring benefits to the patients who receive vaccines, one well-known public
health benefit of vaccination is “herd” or “community immunity.” If a large enough portion of the
population is immunized against a contagious disease, the whole community—including those who are
not immunized—benefits because the likelihood of an outbreak of the disease is reduced. Consistent with
this important function of vaccination, FDA-approved labeling for certain vaccines, such as Gardasil (the
human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine) and the measles, mumps, rubella (MMR) vaccine, includes
discussion of the population impact of the vaccines—although herd immunity does not appear to have
been studied as part of the pivotal trials. See, e.g., Gardasil Labeling 21, https://www.fda.gov/downloads/
biologicsbloodvaccines/vaccines/approvedproducts/ucm111263.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BT38-82NV];
MMR Labeling 3, https://www.fda.gov/downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/Vaccines/ApprovedProducts/
UCM123789.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT8M-FASK]. FDA’s decision to approve Gardasil for boys and men
may provide another indicator that the agency considers the population effects of vaccines. In making that
decision, the agency appears to have considered both the vaccine’s effectiveness in preventing HPVcaused genital warts, anal cancer, and certain precancerous lesions in vaccinated boys and men as well as
the role that boys and men play in transmitting HPV to girls and women. See, e.g., Lurie Presentation,
supra note 92; cf. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., VACCINE AND RELATED BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS ADVISORY
COMMITTEE, Transcript of Proceeding at 183 (Sept. 9, 2009) (quoting the Gardasil sponsor as explaining
that “men play an important role in transmitting HPV to women”), https://wayback.archiveit.org/7993/20170113080600/http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingM
aterials/BloodVaccinesandOtherBiologics/VaccinesandRelatedBiologicalProductsAdvisoryCommittee/U
CM183640.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EHW-ZTCF].
107 See,

e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 384–85; 76 Fed. Reg. 2691 (Jan. 14, 2011).

108 See,

e.g., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SELF-SELECTION STUDIES FOR
NONPRESCRIPTION DRUGS (Apr. 2013), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecompliance
regulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm272122.pdf., [https://perma.cc/D8GN-TU3Q].
109 21

U.S.C. § 355(d).
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regulations on new drug applications or to justify individual regulatory actions.110 In
this Part, we evaluate the agency’s statutory authority to consider such health
impacts in applying the statutory standard for approval (or withdrawal of a drug’s
approval), concluding that it, indeed, possesses that authority.
As a preliminary matter, for the subset of drugs with externalities that are
controlled substances, the FDCA’s relationship to the CSA is relevant to determining
the scope of FDA’s authority because “the meaning of one statute may be affected
by other Acts.”111 In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Supreme
Court concluded—based on federal law before the enactment of the 2009 Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (Tobacco Control Act)112—that
Congress did not intend for FDA to regulate tobacco products in part because
Congress had “directly addressed the problem of tobacco” through federal legislation
that did not provide a role for the agency.113 The context for controlled substances is
quite different. The CSA clearly envisions a role for FDA in regulating controlled
substances, and, importantly, does not change FDA’s approval standard or the
agency’s ability to determine independently which controlled substances have met
that standard.114
For all drugs with externalities (including controlled substances), the agency’s
mission—of protecting and promoting the public health by “taking appropriate
action on the marketing of regulated products”115—and the evolving nature of
technology and scientific understanding suggest that the FDCA ought to be
interpreted broadly.116 Under this view, Congress did not intend to “specify every
detail of regulation” when enacting the FDCA and its numerous amendments.117
Rather, Congress intended the FDCA to be nimble enough to allow FDA to address
emerging and evolving technologies and problems.118 For example, as a practical
matter, it is difficult to imagine that Congress would not want FDA to consider the
full range of risks associated with drugs such as opioids when making its approval
decisions.119

110 See, e.g., 50 Fed. Reg. 7452 (Feb. 22, 1985) (final rule for relevant revisions to 21 C.F.R. pt.
314); 47 Fed. Reg. 46,622 (proposed rule for relevant revisions to 21 C.F.R. pt. 314).
111 Food

& Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000).

112 Family

Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776

(2009).
113 Brown
114 See
115 21

& Williamson, 529 U.S. at 137.

notes 73–80, supra, and accompanying text.

U.S.C. § 393(b).

116 See,

e.g., Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation under the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, 28 FOOD DRUG COSMETIC L.J. 177, 178 (1973); see also United States v. Article of Drug
Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969) (“[R]emedial legislation such as the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act is to be given a liberal construction consistent with the Act’s overriding purpose to protect the public
health.”); cf. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 63 (2012) (“A textually permissible interpretation that furthers rather than obstructs the document’s
purpose should be favored.”).
117 Hutt,
118 See

supra note 116, at 178.

id.

119 Cf. The Federal Response to the Opioid Crisis: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Indian Affairs,
(2017) (written testimony on behalf of witnesses from the Department of Health and Human Services)
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm579512.htm [https://perma.cc/GY3A-T22L].
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In addition to this general principle of interpreting the FDCA broadly, through
considering the FDCA in light of the agency’s public health mission,120 we conclude
that there are specific legal arguments that support the agency’s authority to consider
a broad range of evidence in its approval and withdrawal decisions. To be clear, we
are not arguing that FDA’s approvals are for anything other than the indication in the
approved labeling, nor should our discussion be viewed as undermining the
regulatory focus on a product’s intended use. FDA approvals are focused on the
specific indication in a drug’s proposed labeling because evidence establishing
effectiveness is typically limited to that indication and a drug’s risks may be
outweighed by its benefits for one clinical scenario but not for others.121 Likewise,
there are vital public health rationales for current FDA rules that limit
pharmaceutical marketing to the specific approved indication such as helping to
ensure that such marketing is informative and non-misleading, encouraging rigorous
studies of the safety and effectiveness of new indications, and maintaining the
integrity of the drug approval framework.122 But in weighing the benefits and risks of
a drug for an intended use, FDA is not required to ignore the ways that provider and
patient behaviors—actual use of the drug—influence that weighing for individual
patients, and for the broader population.

1. Whole Text
The Supreme Court has explained that “[s]tatutory construction [ ] is a holistic
endeavor.”123 This means that a statutory provision should be read to be “compatible
with the rest of the law,” including its other provisions, its structure, and its
subsequent amendments124 to “fit, if possible, all parts into a harmonious whole.”125
Consistent with this idea, the drug approval language in section 505(d) of the FDCA
cannot be read apart from the rest of the FDCA. Numerous provisions in the FDCA
contemplate FDA relying on evidence about how a drug is actually used to weigh the

120 See,

e.g., Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. at 798.

121 See,

e.g., FDA MEMO, supra note 88, at 7.

122 See,

e.g., FDA MEMO, supra note 88, at 10–11; Nathan Cortez, The Statutory Case Against OffLabel Promotion, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 124 (2016); Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and
Promotion, supra note 9, at 231; Joshua M. Sharfstein & Alta Charo, The Promotion of Medical Products
in the 21st Century: Off-Label Marketing and First Amendment Concerns, 314 JAMA 1795, 1796 (2015).
But see Coleen Klasmeier & Martin H. Redish, Off-Label Prescription Advertising, the FDA and the First
Amendment: A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech Protection, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 315, 316
(2011) (“[I]n many instances [as a result of FDA’s policies on off-label promotion] doctors are likely to be
deprived of valuable information about important off-label uses that are totally lawful and extremely
beneficial to some very sick people.”).
123 United Sav. Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988);
see also Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000)
(discussing whole-text canon); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 116, at 167 (explaining that statute “must
be construed as a whole”); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR, PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY, app. B at 2021 (4th
ed. 2007) (“Statutory interpretation is a ‘holistic’ endeavor.”).
124 United Sav. Ass’n., 484 U.S. at 371; see also Cortez, supra note 122, at 138–39 (describing the
whole-text canon).
125 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133 (quoting FTC v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389
(1959)) (internal quotations omitted).
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drug’s benefits and risks, including provider and patient behaviors that affect the
benefit-risk balance.126
One clear example comes from the requirements for information that must be
included in a drug’s application and reported after approval. Section 505(b) of the
FDCA requires that sponsors of new drug applications submit, as part of their
application, “full reports of investigations which have been made to show whether or
not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in use” without
limiting the required information to that about the uses described in the drug’s
proposed labeling.127 In its regulations, FDA has noted that the type of information
necessary to make approval decisions varies across drugs,128 and studies and
information related to misuse of the drug are required specifically for drugs with that
potential.129
After approval, section 505(k)(1) requires sponsors to report to FDA any
information about an approved drug relevant to FDA’s ability to determine whether
to withdraw approval.130 One requirement that FDA has imposed pursuant to this
authority is that sponsors must submit “adverse drug experience information” to the
agency, which includes information about “any” adverse event regardless of whether
it is associated with a use described in the approved labeling.131 For over-the-counter
(OTC) drugs marketed under a monograph rather than an approved application, the
FDCA requires broad reporting of adverse events including those that reflect uses
not described in the drug’s labeling, such as overdose and misuse.132
Similarly, in the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of
2007, Congress instructed FDA to create a system for proactive post-market
surveillance of marketed drugs, known as Sentinel.133 The statute requires FDA “to
provide for active adverse event surveillance” using data from a wide range of
sources, including electronic health records and insurance claims—sources that
contain information about how drugs are actually used, not limited to the intended
uses described in the labeling.134 This provision also required FDA to establish
standardized procedures for reporting “all serious adverse drug experiences,”

126 Cf. Patricia J. Zettler, The Indirect Consequences of Expanded Off-Label Promotion, 78 OHIO
STATE L.J. 1053, 1087–88 (2017) (making a similar argument with respect to the agency’s authority to
consider off-label uses in its approval decisions).
127 21 U.S.C. § 355(b); see Zettler, Expanded Off-Label Promotion, supra note 126, at 1087 (citing
the same provision).
128 21

C.F.R. § 314.105(c).

129 21

C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(vii).

130 21

U.S.C. § 355(k).

131 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a), (c); see also 44 Fed. Reg. 19,434, 19,434 (Apr. 3, 1979) (explaining that
adverse experience reporting is required to enable FDA to make determinations about whether there are
grounds for withdrawing approval).
132 21

U.S.C. § 379aa.

133 21

U.S.C. § 355(k)(3); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA’s Sentinel Initiative (2017)
https://www.fda.gov/safety/fdassentinelinitiative/ucm2007250.htm; [https://perma.cc/6TN8-G5W3]; see
Barbara J. Evans, Authority of the Food and Drug Administration to Require Data Access and Control
Use Rights in the Sentinel Data Network, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 67, 73–75 (2010) (describing Sentinel);
Efthimios Parasidis, Patients over Politics: Addressing Legislative Failure in the Regulation of Medical
Products, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 929, 951 (2011) (describing same).
134 21

U.S.C. § 355(k)(3).
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without restriction, including those that occur from overdose and misuse.135 Thus, in
requiring FDA to create Sentinel and standardized reporting procedures, Congress
envisioned FDA monitoring the full range of safety and effectiveness information
associated with marketed drugs as they are actually used.136
The recently-enacted 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act) underscores that an
expansive range of information is available to FDA when it makes its benefit-risk
determinations.137 For example, Sections 3001 and 3002 amended the FDCA to
require that FDA, after approving a new drug, publicly describe the patient
experience data, if any, that it reviewed and to develop a plan for issuing guidance on
“the collection of patient experience data, and the use of such data.”138 The law
defines patient experience data as including information about “the impact
of . . . a . . . therapy [] on patients’ lives” and “patient preferences with respect to
treatment.”139 This language appears broad enough to include a wide variety of
information and in the context of opioids would certainly encompass how using the
drug is affecting a patient’s family’s well-being.140 Indeed, as of the time of writing,
FDA is planning to hold a public meeting on patient-focused drug development for
opioid use disorder (OUD), at which it will be soliciting patient perspectives on the
“emotional or social effects of OUD,” as well as OUD’s impact on patients’ “ability
to function in [their] personal . . . life.”141 Additionally, Section 3022 of the Cures
Act requires FDA to “establish a program to evaluate the potential use of real world
evidence” in its approval decisions for new indications for already-approved
drugs.142 Real world evidence is defined as including “data regarding the usage, or
the potential benefits or risks, of a drug derived from sources other than randomized
clinical trials.”143 Accordingly, it is likely to include information about how a drug is
actually used—again suggesting that FDA is authorized to consider a broad range of
information in its benefit-risk determinations at the time of approval.
These provisions exemplify how a broad spectrum of information—including
information about how a drug may be actually prescribed and used by providers and
patients—will be evaluated by FDA when it is determining whether the standard for
approval is initially met, and whether drugs continue to meet that standard after

135 21

U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(C)(i)(II) (emphasis added).

136 See,

e.g., Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of A New Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 482 (2010); cf. Michael J.
Malinowski, Doctors, Patients, and Pills-A System Popping Under Too Much Physician Discretion? A
Law-Policy Prescription to Make Drug Approval More Meaningful in the Delivery of Health Care, 33
CARDOZO L. REV. 1085, 1121 (2012) (“[FDAAA] expresses a belief that drawing more information from
the physician-patient experience into the regulatory process with enhanced FDA market presence will
shore up the reliability of prescription drugs.”).
137 Pub.

L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016).

138 Id.

at §§ 3001, 3002.

139 Id.

at § 3001.

140 Cf.

NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 393 (describing the “benefits and risks to members of a
patient’s household” as something FDA should consider in its regulation of opioids).
141 83 Fed. Reg. 11,208, 11,209 (Mar. 14, 2018). This Federal Register Notice provides the full list
of the topics related to patient-focused drug development for OUD on which FDA is soliciting
information.
142 Pub.
143 Id.

L. No. 114-255 § 3022, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016).
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marketing. In the provisions added by the Cures Act, Congress expressly described
FDA taking a broad perspective on the information relevant to its benefit-risk
determinations in additional contexts. It seems inconsistent with the FDCA to require
that sponsors submit such information to FDA, and to authorize FDA to gather such
information itself through Sentinel, but at the same time prohibit the agency from
considering that full range of information in making its benefit-risk determinations.

2. Absurdity
A second, related argument supporting FDA’s authority to permit use of
population-level information that it deems relevant to its drug-specific benefit-risk
determinations comes from the “absurdity doctrine.”144 Under this doctrine, courts
have departed “from the plain meaning of statutory text when its literal application
would lead to an ‘absurd’ result” in light of the statutory context.145 Looking at other
provisions in the FDCA, one could argue that it would be absurd to read the statutory
standard for approval as limiting FDA to only considering information about the
safety and effectiveness of a drug when used as described in FDA-approved labeling
or only by populations described in the approved labeling.
One could make this argument based on many of the provisions described in the
previous section. It would be strange to require sponsors submit a wide range of
information to FDA, including information about drugs arising from uses that depart
from the approved labeling, while at the same time prohibiting FDA from
considering that information in its benefit-risk determinations.146
Another example might come from some of the additional powers granted to FDA
in FDAAA.147 These drug safety tools include the authority to require a REMS and
postapproval safety labeling changes, studies, and trials.148 In deciding whether to
require any of these risk mitigation measures, the FDCA explicitly authorizes FDA
to consider information about drug uses that depart from those described in the
approved labeling, and from sources that will include information about how drugs
are actually used, including Sentinel.149 It would be absurd to permit FDA to impose
144 See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER , supra note 116, at 234; see also Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala,
140 F.3d 1060, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“In deciding whether a result is absurd, we consider not only
whether that result is contrary to common sense, but also whether it is inconsistent with the clear
intentions of the statute’s drafters—that is, whether the result is absurd when considered in the particular
statutory context.”).
145 Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1002 (2006); Mova Pharm. Corp., 140
F.3d. at 1068; see also United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (“The plain
meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the ‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of a
statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.’”); Holy Trinity
Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892) (If a literal construction of the words of a statute be
absurd, the act must be so construed as to avoid the absurdity.); ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 123, at app.
B at 20 (“Avoid interpreting a provision in a way inconsistent with the overall structure of the statute or
with another provision . . . .”).
146 Cf. Mova Pharma Corp., 140 F.3d at 1068 (connecting “absurdity” to the “statutory context”);
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 116, at 167 (explaining that the “whole-text doctrine” overlaps with other
tools of statutory construction).
147 See Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007); cf. Zettler, Toward Coherent Federal Oversight,
supra note 8, at 454, 456, 462 (making a similar argument with respect to the agency’s REMS authority
and its ability to consider off-label uses in its approval decisions).
148 21

U.S.C. §§ 355(o)(3), (4); 355-1.

149 21

U.S.C. § 355-1(b) (defining adverse drug experience and new safety information).
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requirements for studying and mitigating drugs’ risks based on their real-world
effects, but prohibit the agency from making approval or withdrawal decisions—
which could be characterized as the agency’s most powerful risk mitigation tools—
based on the same information.150 This argument is perhaps strongest for FDA’s
REMS authority. FDA may require a REMS when necessary to ensure that a drug’s
benefits outweigh its risks—that is, to ensure that drug meets the approval standard
in the FDCA.151 If FDA can consider a drug’s real-world effects to determine
whether a REMS is needed, it would be odd to conclude that FDA cannot consider
that same information in deciding whether to approve, or withdraw approval of, a
drug.

3. Congressional Acquiescence
The theory of Congressional acquiescence or approval also supports an
interpretation of the FDCA that permits FDA to take a broad perspective on the
evidence relevant to its benefit-risk determinations. Although Congressional inaction
is not generally a good indicator of legislative intent, the Supreme Court has
explained that “the silence of Congress . . . may sometimes give rise to an
implication as to the Congressional purpose,” particularly when the interpretation of
a statute is long-standing and there has been “abundant opportunity” for
amendments.152 In this case, FDA has had regulations in place since 1985
interpreting the FDCA as giving the agency “flexibility” in determining what
information is needed for it to determine whether a drug meets the statutory standard
for approval.153 Although FDA has not formally interpreted this flexibility as
encompassing a public health basis for approval decisions, the language is broad
enough to cover such an approach. Additionally, FDA has implemented a public
health perspective publicly in specific cases since the regulation was originally
promulgated.154 Over the past three decades, Congress has had ample opportunity to
revise the FDCA, with FDA’s authority being amended over 20 times since 1985,155
and Congress revisiting the FDCA at least every five years since 1992 to re-authorize
medical product user fees.156 Thus, a court could conclude that Congress has

150 On the other hand, one might also argue that this result would not be absurd, because it makes
sense for FDA to consider different information in restrictions that fall short of a complete ban on
marketing.
151 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a); see Ameet Sarpatwari et al., Using a Drug-Safety Tool to Prevent
Competition, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1476, 1476–77 (2014) (“REMS requirements have also been hailed
as a means for the FDA to approve important new drugs that might otherwise have been rejected.”).
152 See Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 479 (1939); 73 AM. JUR. 2D STATUTES § 82; see also
Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 155 (2000) (discussing
Congressional acquiescence); Cortez, supra note 122, at 141–42 (discussing same).
153 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50(d)(5)(vii), 314.105(c); 50 Fed. Reg. 7452 (Feb. 22, 1985) (final rule for
relevant revisions to 21 C.F.R. pt. 314).
154 See

Part II.A, supra.

155 See,

e.g., Peter Barton Hutt, The State of Science at the Food and Drug Administration, 60
ADMIN. L. REV. 431, 467 (2008); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Milestones in U.S. Food & Drug Law History,
https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/history/milestones/ucm128305.htm
[https://perma.cc/UL8JL7LB].
156 See, e.g., Jonathan J. Darrow, et al., Speed, Safety and Industry Funding: From PDUFA to the
FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017, 377 NEW ENGL. J. MED 2278, 2278–80 (2017).
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acquiesced to FDA’s interpretation of the FDCA as enabling it to consider a wide
range of evidence in its approval and withdrawal decisions.

4. Deference
There are, of course, weaknesses to these arguments that FDA may incorporate
population health considerations into its benefit-risk determinations for drugs.
Perhaps most obviously, although the context of the statute cannot be ignored, one
might nevertheless point to the precise language of the approval standard—
specifying that safety and effectiveness is determined “under the conditions
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling.”157
This language can be compared to the amendments to the FDCA enacted through
the Tobacco Control Act. The Tobacco Control Act amended the FDCA to give FDA
jurisdiction over tobacco products, requiring, among other things, pre-market
authorization for “new tobacco products.”158 The standard for the agency to authorize
the marketing of a new tobacco product is that marketing it “would be appropriate
for the protection of the public health,”159 considering “the risks and benefits to the
population as a whole, including users and nonusers of the tobacco product.”160
Congress, therefore, can clearly articulate an approval standard that permits FDA to
incorporate public health considerations into its approval determinations. Because
such precise language is not found in the drug approval parts of the statute, one
might argue that Congress did not intend to authorize FDA to apply a similar
standard to its drug approval (and withdrawal) decisions.161
But no one canon of statutory interpretation trumps all others, and courts may be
likely to defer to FDA’s inclination to include considerations such as provider and
patient behaviors in its benefit-risk determinations for drugs as a reasonable
interpretation of the FDCA. Under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,162 courts defer to “permissible” agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutory provisions.163 In light of the arguments described above, courts
would have sufficient grounds to conclude that the FDCA is at least ambiguous as to
the scope of information that FDA may incorporate into its benefit-risk
determinations for drugs, and that FDA has appropriately interpreted the FDCA as
giving the agency flexibility in special cases, as set forth in its regulations. Even if
Chevron was overturned,164 courts may be likely to agree with FDA’s interpretation

157 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL, supra note 123, app. B at 19 (“Plain meaning rule: follow the plain
meaning of the statutory text.”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 116, at 56 (“When deciding an issue
governed by the text of a legal instrument, the careful lawyer or judge . . . examines the very words of the
instrument.”).
158 Family

Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776

(2009).
159 21

U.S.C. § 387j(c)(2)(A).

160 Id.

at § 387j(c)(4).

161 Cf.

Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 216 (2005) (“Congress has included an express
overt-act requirement in at least 22 other current conspiracy statutes, clearly demonstrating that it knows
how to impose such a requirement when it wishes to do so.”).
162 467
163 Id.

U.S. 837 (1984).

at 842–43; see also Cortez, supra note 122, at 136–37 (describing the “Chevron two-step”).

164 See,

e.g., Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 5, 115th Congress (as passed by House, Jan. 11,
2017); The Chevron Doctrine: Constitutional and Statutory Questions in Judicial Deference to Agencies:
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in this instance. Because the FDCA’s “primary objective” is “protect[ing] the public
health,”165 courts may view an interpretation of the FDCA as authorizing the agency
to exercise flexibility in what information it deems necessary to analyze the benefits
and risks of drugs as well-founded.166

III. IMPLEMENTING FDA’S BROAD AUTHORITY
Because of the clear and extensive public health harms associated with opioid use
and misuse, as well as the history of misleading industry marketing, opioids present a
particularly compelling case for FDA to consider a broad range of evidence, such as
provider and patient behaviors that affect the benefits and risks of drugs, in its
regulatory decisions, including approval and withdrawal decisions.167 But FDA’s
legal authority does not require that the agency limit this approach only to the
opioids context,168 as there are other drugs for which this approach may be
necessary.169

Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016); Examining Agency Use of Deference: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Regulatory Affairs and Federal Management of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2016); Jonathan H. Adler, Restoring Chevron’s Domain, 81 MO. L.
REV. 983 (2016); Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron: A Literature Review, 16 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 103 (2018). But see Kristin E. Hickman & Nicholas R. Bednar, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392 (2017) (“[C]laims that Chevron is in decline are overblown.”).
165 Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Food & Drug Admin., 484 F. Supp. 1179, 1183 (D. Del. 1980), aff’d, 634
F.2d 106 (3d Cir. 1980); see United States v. Article of Drug Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969).
166 Moreover, some scholars have argued that Chevron did not, in fact, bring about a significant
change in how frequently agencies prevail in litigation—that is, the standard of review may not affect the
outcome of challenges to agencies’ practices. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The
Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1120 (2008) (“Contrary to the conventional wisdom, Chevron is not the
alpha and the omega of Supreme Court agency-deference jurisprudence.”); David Zaring, Reasonable
Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 169 (2010) (reporting a study finding “[c]ourts reverse agencies at roughly
the same rate, regardless of the standard of review”); cf. Peter H. Schuck and E. Donald Elliott, To the
Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 985 (1990)
(finding that agencies prevailed more frequently immediately after Chevron, but that this effect lessened
over time). But see Adler, supra note 164, at 986 (“Chevron’s significance grew over time.”); Kent
Barnett and Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2017) (an
empirical analysis finding that agencies prevail more often in the lower courts when Chevron applies, but
not at the Supreme Court). Consistent with this view, courts often deferred to FDA’s positions before
Chevron. See, e.g., United States v. Article of Drug Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 791–92 (1969) (“It is
enough for us that the expert agency charged with the enforcement of remedial legislation has determined
that such regulation is desirable for the public health, for we are hardly qualified to second-guess the
Secretary’s medical judgment.”); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 553 (1979) (“[T]he
construction of a statute by those charged with its administration is entitled to substantial deference . . . .
Such deference is particularly appropriate where, as here, an agency’s interpretation involves issues of
considerable public controversy, and Congress has not acted to correct any misperception of its statutory
objectives.”); Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1980)
(“The rule that the FDA rather than the courts must first determine the safety and effectiveness of a drug is
but an extension of the general principle that the agency is usually better equipped by reason of its
expertise to make the determination than the court.”); cf. Eskridge and Bauer, supra, at 1120 (“[T]he
Court was highly deferential to agency interpretations before Chevron.”).
167 See,
168 See
169 See

e.g., Gottlieb & Woodcock, supra note 7; NAS REPORT, supra note 6.

Part II.B, supra.

Part II.A, supra; cf. Scott Gottlieb, Reducing the Hurdles for Complex Generic Drug
Development, FDA VOICE (Oct. 2, 2017), https://blogs.fda.gov/FDAvoice/index.php/2017/10/
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Other drugs with the potential for misuse on their own or along with opioids,
include benzodiazepines approved to treat anxiety and gabapentin (Neurontin), a
treatment for neuropathic pain.170 But the approach we have outlined may also be
applicable to drugs without the potential for misuse. For example, appropriate
prescribing of antimicrobial drugs is essential to minimize the development of
resistant bacteria that can then infect others, while vaccines provide benefits to the
population through “herd immunity” apart from their benefits for individual
patients.171 Any prescription drug with common “off-label” uses—for indications not
formally reviewed and approved by FDA—that substantially alter its populationlevel benefit-risk profile might be viewed as having externalities. As one example,
drugs approved for dementia, narcolepsy, and attention deficit disorders have
received attention for their potentially dangerous off-label uses as cognitive
enhancers in healthy individuals.172 As another example, we might expect a highly
effective weight loss drug approved for patients with obesity or severe obesity to be
used widely outside of that patient population, because of the social stigma
associated with being even moderately overweight.173 If use of such drugs outside of
severely obese patients becomes commonplace, whether or not actively encouraged
by the pharmaceutical manufacturer—as occurred in the 1990s with the use of
fenfluramine/phentermine174—it may alter the population-level benefit-risk profile of
the drug, because these patients are not at the same risk of adverse health outcomes.
Thus, there are a variety of drugs and drug classes for which FDA could
incorporate a wide range of evidence in its benefit-risk determinations, including
how patients and providers actually use a drug. Yet it is not clear precisely when and
how the agency will do so in its approval and withdrawal decisions. Accordingly, in
this Part, we offer some considerations for systematically and sensibly assessing the
benefits and risks of drugs with externalities. Although not a comprehensive list of
all considerations for, or practical consequences of, implementation,175 these

[https://perma.cc/T2CK-39BF] (describing drug prices as a “public health concern that FDA should
address”).
170 See, e.g., Xanax (alprazolam) Labeling, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs
/label/2016/018276s052lbl.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ57-9BVK]; Carmen Heredia Rodriguez, New on the
Streets: Drug for Nerve Pain Boosts High for Opioid Abusers, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 6, 2017),
https://khn.org/news/new-on-the-streets-drug-for-nerve-pain-boosts-high-for-opioid-abusers
[https://perma.cc/3R65-XDUM].
171 See, e.g., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Battle of the Bugs, supra note 10; Vaccines.gov, Community
Immunity (“Herd Immunity”), https://www.vaccines.gov/basics/protection/index.html [https://perma.cc/
QG2L-VUNU].
172 See, e.g., Martha J. Farah et al., Neurocognitive Enhancement: What Can We Do and What
Should We Do?, 5 NATURE REV. NEUROSCIENCE 421 (2004).
173 Cf. Zettler, Expanded Off-Label Promotion, supra note 126, at 1089 (describing a similar
example).
174 See, e.g., Steven R. Salbu, The FDA and Public Access to New Drugs: Appropriate Levels of
Scrutiny in the Wake of HIV, AIDS, and the Diet Drug Debacle, 79 B.U. L. REV. 93, 124 (1999).
175 As one example, systematically incorporating population health information into approval
decisions for certain drugs may alter industry’s willingness to develop potentially beneficial drugs or drug
classes if they also have the potential for significant externalities—particularly if evaluating population
health information significantly lengthens the time necessary to develop a drug or is perceived as doing so.
Cf. Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 299, 301 (2015) (describing the “goal
of creating incentives for innovation in pharmaceuticals and production of socially valuable data”).
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suggestions are intended to aid in thoughtful administration of the agency’s authority
to take a public health perspective in its approval and withdrawal decisions.

A. When to Implement
Consistent with its statutory authority, current regulations, and public health
mission,176 FDA can, and should, incorporate all relevant evidence into its benefitrisk determinations whenever warranted by the particular drug or drug class that the
agency is reviewing. This approach will not be necessary or helpful for all drugs.
FDA’s traditional approach to assessing the benefits and risks of drugs, focused on
the clinical trials of their intended uses as described in FDA-approved labeling,
works well for many drugs. Apart from situations such as opioids—in which there is
widespread recognition of the drugs’ population health impacts, including in FDA
regulations and guidance,177 and of the influence that misleading marketing may
have had on prescribing decisions—there may be considerable disagreement about
when a drug or drug class can be adequately evaluated through the conventional
approach, or, instead, has the potential to impact population health such that FDA
must consider a wider body of evidence.
Furthermore, it may be difficult for the agency to articulate general guidelines
about when it will implement a broad approach that are not specific to a drug product
or class. FDA regulations explain only that it must “exercise its scientific judgment”
in determining the information necessary to assess a drug’s benefits and risks.178 In a
preamble, the agency further explained that “applications for new members of an
established class of drugs should take into account experience gained with that
class . . . This may involve, for example, more detailed safety data if marketing
experience with the class has revealed special safety concerns.”179 But beyond these
statements, there is little public information about when the agency will incorporate
broader information into its decision-making.
There, however, may be a few steps the agency could take to help ensure a
consistent application of its authority to incorporate population health impacts into
its decision-making, and clarify its thinking for stakeholders. First, FDA should be
consistent, treating like cases alike. Such consistency is necessary under the
Administrative Procedures Act, which authorizes courts to set aside arbitrary and
capricious agency actions,180 and is good policy.181 It is fair to, and provides

176 See,

e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 393(b); 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(c).

177 See,

e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.50; FOOD & DRUG. ADMIN., Guidance for Industry: Abuse-Deterrent
Opioids – Evaluation and Labeling (Apr. 2015), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/
UCM334743.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JKX-N67V].
178 21

C.F.R. § 314.105(c).

179 50

Fed. Reg. 7452, 7483 (Feb. 22, 1985).

180 See,

e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Etelson v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 684 F.2d 918, 926 (D.C. Cir.
1982); see also Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Shalala, 963 F. Supp. 20, 27 (D.D.C. 1997) (“[FDA] must treat
similar cases in a similar manner unless it can provide a legitimate reason for failing to do so.”).
Consistency may also make courts more likely to defer to the agency’s positions. See, e.g., Christopher J.
Walker, How to Win the Deference Lottery, 91 TEX. L. REV. 73, 80 (2013).
181 See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Therapeutic Orphans, Pediatric Victims? The Best Pharmaceuticals for
Children Act and Existing Pediatric Human Subject Protection, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 661, 680 (2003);
Yoav Dotan, Making Consistency Consistent, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 995, 999 (2005); Miranda Oshige
McGowan, Against Interpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 711, 724 (2005); Laurens Walker & John
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predictability for, regulated entities, and demonstrates rational decision-making.182 If
generalizable principles do emerge through the agency’s experience, FDA should
issue guidance on how it will consistently implement its “flexibility” in applying the
approval standards for drugs.183
As part of the numerous communications that FDA schedules with manufacturers
during the drug development process,184 FDA also should communicate to a drug’s
manufacturer the range of evidence it will need to assess a particular drug’s benefits
and risks as early as possible, so that the manufacturer has sufficient notice of the
agency’s expectations. For some drugs, such as novel opioids that are likely to be
associated with the same risks as currently-marketed opioids, this will be clear early
in drug development, perhaps even before the drug’s clinical trials begin.185 For other
drugs, the need for a broad range of evidence may not become apparent until later in
development, or after approval when it is known how the drug is actually used by
providers and patients and new risks emerge.186
To help all regulated entities understand FDA’s thinking in this area, the agency
could make public what has triggered a need for population health impact
information about a particular drug or drug class, and what kind of information or
data is needed, as early as the law allows such transparency.187 This would be
concordant with ongoing work at FDA to improve transparency, as well as a growing
consensus about the importance of transparency among regulators in other countries
and the biomedical community generally.188 FDA also could use its advisory
committees to help the agency decide whether a public health perspective is needed

Monahan, Scientific Authority: The Breast Implant Litigation and Beyond, 86 VA. L. REV. 801, 821
(2000).
182 See, e.g., id.; see also Patricia J. Zettler et al., Closing the Regulatory Gap for Synthetic Nicotine
Products, 59 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (making a similar argument), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3045317.
183 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(c) (“FDA makes its views on drug products and classes of drugs available
through guidance documents, recommendations, and other statements of policy.”).
184 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.102(a) (“During the course of reviewing an application[,] . . . FDA
shall communicate with applicants about scientific, medical, and procedural issues that arise . . . .”);
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-01-01-00590, FDA’S REVIEW
PROCESS FOR NEW DRUG APPLICATIONS (Mar. 2003) (“FDA works collaboratively with sponsors.”).
185 See,

e.g., NAS Report, supra note 6, at 392–96; 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7483 (Feb. 22, 1985).

186 FDA,

policymakers, and scholars acknowledge that many drugs are associated with risks that do
not become apparent until after approval. See, e.g., INST. OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY:
PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 38 (2007) [hereinafter “IOM DRUG SAFETY
REPORT”]; Nicholas S. Downing et al., Postmarket Safety Events Among Novel Therapeutics Approved by
the US Food and Drug Administration Between 2001 and 2010, 317 JAMA 1854 (2017); Parasidis, supra
note 133, at 949.
187 See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 9, 400, 412 (describing a “commitment to transparency”
as necessary in FDA regulation of opioids).
188 See, e.g., Afia K. Asamoah & Joshua M. Sharfstein, Transparency at the Food and Drug
Administration, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2341 (2010); Peter Lurie et al., Comparison of Content of FDA
Letters Not Approving Applications for New Drugs and Associated Public Announcements from Sponsors:
Cross Sectional Survey, 350 BRITISH MED. J. h2758 (2015); Joshua M. Sharfstein and Michael Stebbins,
Enhancing Transparency at the US Food and Drug Administration: Moving Beyond the 21st Century
Cures Act, 317 JAMA 1621 (2017); Joshua M. Sharfstein et al., Blueprint for Transparency at the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration: Recommendations to Advance the Development of Safe and Effective
Medical Products, 45 J. L. MED. ETHICS 7 (2017).
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for a particular drug, to incorporate population health information into its benefit-risk
determination, or both. Because advisory committee meetings must be public,189
routinely seeking advisory committee advice would also promote transparency and
public accountability.
Even if FDA is transparent about the data needed for approval as early as possible,
explicitly taking a public health approach may spark concerns that the agency is
slowing the approval process.190 But, because the public health approach would be
applied to approval (and withdrawal) decisions for only for those drug products and
classes that have population health impacts that affect their benefit-risk profiles—
such as opioids—concerns about generalized changes to the approval process are not
merited. Moreover, we are not arguing that FDA should refuse to approve, or
withdraw approval of, any particular drug product or drug class subject to additional
analysis of their social or clinical externalities.191 If it determines that the benefit-risk
profile still merits approval, FDA first could turn to risk mitigation tools, such as
REMS, to address such externalities.192 Indeed, FDA is reportedly currently in the
process of revising the REMS for extended release opioids, and has expanded REMS
requirements to also apply to immediate release opioids.193 Similarly, before FDA
requested that Endo Pharmaceuticals remove Opana ER from the market,194 the
agency likely considered whether the REMS could have been changed to sufficiently
mitigate the drug’s risks.195 In those instances, such as for Opana ER, in which other
risk mitigation tools are not sufficient to address the population health impacts of a

189 5

U.S.C. app. 2 § 10(a).

190 Cf.

Leah Isakov et al., Is the FDA Too Conservative or Too Aggressive?: A Bayesian Decision
Analysis of Clinical Trial Design 1 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21499, 2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2641547 [https://perma.cc/J4JW-WSR6] (arguing
generally that FDA can be too conservative); Robert Kocher & Bryan Roberts, The Calculus of Cures, 370
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1473, 1474 (2014) (arguing same). But see Chul Kim & Vinay Prasad, Strength of
Validation for Surrogate Endpoints Used in the US Food and Drug Administration’s Approval of
Oncology Drugs, 91 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 713, 723 (2016) (arguing that FDA can be too lenient);
Matthew Herper, The FDA Is Basically Approving Everything. Here’s the Data to Prove It, FORBES (Aug.
20,
2015),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2015/08/20/the-fda-is-basically-approvingeverything-heres-the-data-to-prove-it/#65b42fb45e0a [https://perma.cc/VN8E-29DH] (same).
191 It is also worth noting that individual regulatory decisions, including approval and withdrawal
decisions, may have unintended consequences. For example, the approval of abuse deterrent formulations
of prescription opioids, and their introduction into the market, may be linked to the increasing use of illicit
opioids such as heroin. See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 6. The potential for such indirect
consequences may need to be part of regulatory decisions for particular drugs or drug classes.
192 See, e.g., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SAFETY LABELING CHANGES 3
(July 2013), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/
ucm250783.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YSK-UMKP] (explaining that withdrawing approval is “not normally
desirable if some patients [a]re benefitting from the drug despite its risks”).
193 See, e.g., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) for Opioid
Analgesics (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/
ucm163647.htm [https://perma.cc/8Z3F-4YUV].
194 See
195 Cf.

supra notes 97–101, and accompanying text.

FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Summary Minutes of the Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory
Committee and Anesthetic and Analgesic Drug Products Advisory Committee Joint Meeting (Mar. 13–14,
2017),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Drugs/
AnestheticAndAnalgesicDrugProductsAdvisoryCommittee/UCM551226.pdf
[https://perma.cc/75G7ESFW] (explaining that some advisory committee members “doubted the ability of either labeling or
REMS to mitigate [Opana’s] risk of abuse and related adverse health effects”).
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particular product or drug class, the agency can, and should, take into account those
population health impacts in its approval and withdrawal decisions in a fair and
transparent manner.

B. Obtaining Data Necessary for Implementation
If FDA were to determine that additional information about a drug’s public health
impacts is necessary, it also needs to consider how that information should be
obtained. Randomized, controlled trials (RCTs) will continue to be the gold-standard
for evaluating the benefits and risks of all drugs, including those with population
health impacts. But obtaining the data and information about public health impacts,
including how provider and patient behaviors affect a drug’s benefits and risks is, of
course, critical for enabling FDA to incorporate such information into its decisionmaking, and traditional RCTs may be insufficient to assess such factors.196 For
example, the agency may need to understand the risks associated with patients who
use opioids or other drugs of misuse and then transition to illicit drugs, the sort of
question that is not readily addressed in a randomized prospective trial.197 For
example, in July 2017, the agency held a public workshop to discuss methods for
studying the effects of abuse-deterrent formulations of opioids.198
Accordingly, other methods for understanding the benefit-risk profiles of drugs
with externalities should be developed. Although assessing the risk-benefit profiles
of drugs through means other than traditional RCTs may seem like a significant shift
in how Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) has historically operated,
it is consistent with ongoing efforts at CDER.199 Indeed, in some, and perhaps many,
instances, CDER may be able to obtain the data and information that it needs to
assess population health impacts of drugs through initiatives that are already
underway. Sentinel, and the incorporation of real-world evidence and patient
experience data into its drug and device regulation, are sources that are likely to
provide the agency useful information about the population health impacts of drugs,
including those associated with provider and patient behaviors.200
196 Cf. Laura E. Bothwell et al., Assessing the Gold Standard—Lessons from the History of RCTs,
374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2175 (2016) (discussing strengths and limitations of RCTs); Thomas R. Frieden,
Evidence for Health Decision Making—Beyond Randomized, Controlled Trials, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED.
465, 466 (2016) (asserting that the limitations in RCTs “do[] not suggest that the Food and Drug
Administration should be less stringent in their review of drug safety and efficacy, but rather that there
should be rigorous review of all potentially valid data sources”).
197 See,

e.g., NAS Report, supra note 6, at 388–409.

198 See,

e.g., 82 Fed. Reg. 27,271 (June 14, 2017).

199 See,

e.g., Nina L. Hunter et al., Flexibility in the FDA Approach to Orphan Drug Development 16
NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 737, 738 (2017) (describing FDA’s use of real-world evidence to
overcome limitations of RCTs in the context of orphan drugs); Riley, supra note 8, at 311–12 (describing
FDA’s as “allow[ing] increased flexibility” in clinical trial design in the context of precision medicine); cf.
IOM DRUG SAFETY REPORT, supra note 186, at 4 (describing the limited safety information provided by
pre-approval and recommending that FDA take a “lifecycle” approach to drug regulation).
200 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. 355(k)(3); 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, §§ 3001, 3022, 130
Stat. 1033, 1083–84, 1096–98 (2016); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA
STAFF: USE OF REAL-WORLD EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING FOR MEDICAL
DEVICES (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/
guidancedocuments/ucm513027.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XL5-Q8JM]; FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Enhancing
Benefit-Risk Assessment in Regulatory Decision-Making (2017), https://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/
UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/ucm326192.htm [https://perma.cc/P29M-52L6]; Evans, supra note
133; Jonathan P. Jarow et al., MultiDimensional Evidence Generation and FDA Regulatory Decision
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To gain a full picture, FDA may also need to develop new sources of data and
information designed to address questions about the population health impacts of
drugs.201 Such an effort would be consistent with FDA’s ongoing regulatory science
initiative, which aims to encourage the development of new approaches to
understanding the safety and effectiveness of drugs and other FDA-regulated
products.202 Particularly relevant to understanding the public health impact of certain
drug products and classes may be the agency’s aim of “harness[ing] diverse data” to
assess products, which includes the goal of developing new data sources and
innovative approaches for monitoring drugs and other medical products throughout
their lifecycles.203 In addition to encouraging better methods for understanding the
public health impacts of certain drugs through its regulatory science initiative, the
agency also may be able to draw on its evolving experience with studying and
evaluation the population health impacts of new tobacco products, to inform how the
methods used to undertake a similar evaluation of drug products and classes.204

C. Limits on Implementation
Although FDA must consider evidence about public health implications to
adequately assess certain drugs and drug classes, expressly expanding the kinds of
evidence that the agency considers in evaluating drugs may raise concerns about
enabling the government to advance social or political positions under the guise of
public health.205 Indeed, there is a history of the government using public health
authorities and rationales to achieve other ends,206 which, arguably, includes FDA.
Making: Defining and Using “Real-World” Data, 318 JAMA 703 (2017); Rachel E. Sherman et al., RealWorld Evidence—What Is It and What Can It Tell Us? 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2293 (2016).
201 Apart from concerns about population health impacts of drugs, scholars have suggested additional
ways that, for all drugs, RCT data might be improved or supplemented, such as through designing RCTs
to be more inclusive or crowdsourcing postmarket research. See, e.g., Jonathan J. Darrow, Crowdsourcing
Clinical Trials, 98 MINN. L. REV. 805, 807 (2014); Melissa Fazzari et al., The Phase II/III Transition:
Toward the Proof of Efficacy in Cancer Clinical Trials, 21 CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIALS 360, 361
(2000); see also W. Nicholson Price II, Drug Approval in a Learning Health System, 102 MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (“[I]f FDA learns more about drugs based on how they work in the real world, that
information should be used to address how drugs are labeled, sold, and used.”); Riley, supra note 8, at 290
(“The FDCA structure does little to incentivize clinical trial design that is designed to expose variation
rather than minimize it.”); Ameet Sarpatwari et. al., Crowdsourcing Public Health Experiments: A
Response to Jonathan Darrow’s Crowdsourcing Clinical Trials, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2326 (2014)
(describing some of the limits of crowdsourcing data).
202 See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Strategic Plan for Regulatory Science
https://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RegulatoryScience/ucm268095.htm
[https://perma.cc/83WE-6RGB].
203 See

(2016),

id.

204 The

agency’s experience with applying the approval standard for new tobacco products is
relatively limited at this time—thus far, the agency has only approved eight new tobacco products. See
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Tobacco Product Marketing Orders (2018), http://www.fda.gov/
TobaccoProducts/Labeling/TobaccoProductReviewEvaluation/ucm339928.htm. [https://perma.cc/4SD3YSQL]. But the Center for Tobacco Products may have helpful expertise from which CDER could draw.
205 Cf. Matt Lamkin, Regulating Identity: Medical Regulation as Social Control, B.Y.U. L. REV.
501, 504 (2016) (“[T]he United States’ considerable experience in restricting biomedical interventions on
moral grounds provides ample reason to be skeptical of such proposals.”).
206 See, e.g., PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL ix–xiv (2008) (describing laws permitting or requiring the sterilization of
persons with mental illness in the early and mid-twentieth century); see also Hickox v. Christie, 205 F.
Supp. 3d 579, 585 (D.N.J. 2016) (raising concerns about curtailing civil liberties through quarantine
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FDA’s “bungl[ed]” handling of access to levonorgestrel (Plan B), an emergency
contraceptive, provides one example.207 In 1999 FDA initially approved Plan B for
prescription use. In 2001 the Center for Reproductive Rights filed a Citizen Petition
requesting that FDA move the drug to over-the-counter status, and the manufacturer
also submitted a supplement requesting the switch to over-the-counter status.208
Despite robust data, an advisory committee recommendation that the drug be
switched to over-the-counter status, and career agency staff’s assessment that the
evidence supported the switch, it took over 10 years, and protracted litigation, before
the drug became widely available over-the-counter without proof of a purchaser’s
age because of political interference from two different administrations.209 As
another example, a recently filed lawsuit argues that certain REMS requirements for
mifepristone (Mifeprex), a drug used for pregnancy termination, are not merited by
the benefit-risk profile of the drug.210 Although at the time of writing the outcome of
that litigation remains to be seen, as in the Plan B context, the plaintiffs argue that
there are ample data supporting the conclusion that mifepristone is safe for use
without the REMS requirements and that FDA staff have concluded as much—
implying that the REMS requirements instead reflect the political controversy around
abortion.211
It is not difficult to imagine how social or political considerations similarly could
commingle with FDA’s regulatory decision-making on other drugs and drug classes
in the process of implementing a public health regulatory perspective. Apart from
opioids, other drugs for which this regulatory approach is relevant are also connected
to controversial political and social topics. These include other drugs of misuse212
and drugs for pre-exposure prophylaxis for HIV,213 which both are associated with
stigma, and drugs that can be used for cognitive enhancement, which are associated

authority); Polly J. Price, Epidemics, Outsiders, and Local Protection: Federalism Theater in the Era of
the Shotgun Quarantine, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 369, 424 (2016) (raising the same concerns); Rob Stein,
CDC Seeks Controversial New Quarantine Powers to Stop Outbreaks, NPR (Feb. 2, 2017),
http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/02/02/512678115/cdc-seeks-controversial-new-quarantinepowers-to-stop-outbreaks [https://perma.cc/GA8H-56RA] (describing concerns about new rules that
would significantly broaden federal quarantine authority).
207 Lisa Heinzerling, The FDA’s Plan B Fiasco: Lessons for Administrative Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 927,
928 (2014).
208 See,

e.g., id. at 939.

209 See,

e.g., id.; Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Tummino v.
Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); see also Lars Noah, State Affronts to Federal Primacy
in the Licensure of Pharmaceutical Products, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 17 (2016) (“[F]ederal officials
grudgingly expanded nonprescription availability of [Plan B].”); Julie Rovner, FDA to Increase Access to
Generic Morning-After Pills, NPR (Mar. 2, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2014/03/
02/284397995/fda-to-increase-access-to-generic-morning-after-pills
[https://perma.cc/8NBA-V4KP]
(describing FDA as “removing age restrictions” on levonorgestrel products).
210 Complaint, Chelius v. Wright, No. 17-CV-00493 (D. Hawai’i 2017), https://www.aclu.org/legaldocument/chelius-v-wright-complaint [https://perma.cc/X32A-S4AY].
211 Id.
212 See, e.g., Yngvild Olsen & Joshua M. Sharfstein, Confronting the Stigma of Opioid Use
Disorder—And Its Treatment, 311 JAMA 1393, 1393 (2014).
213 See, e.g., Jim Burress, ‘Truvada Whores’ Stigma Endures Among Doctors and LGBTS,
ADVOCATE (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.advocate.com/health/2014/08/11/truvada-whore-stigma-enduresamong-doctors-and-lgbts.
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with various social concerns including about “cheating,” producing “unnatural”
results, and undermining individual responsibility.214
The line between political and public health concerns is not always clear. For
example, one concern raised about using drugs for cognitive enhancement is that
once such use becomes the norm in some groups, others, who might not have
otherwise chosen to use drugs for cognitive enhancement, will feel pressured to do
so.215 Widespread use of cognitive enhancing drugs implicates both public health
concerns—about the safety and effectiveness of the drugs for that use—but also
concerns about whether such expansive use is socially desirable.216
Although the line between public health, and social or political, considerations
may not always be distinct, FDA should strive to focus solely on questions of public
health.217 This is consistent both with the limits of the agency’s institutional
competence, and its statutory authority. Tying regulatory decisions to sound data
regarding the public health effects of the drugs at issue may be one way to help the
agency keep an appropriate scope to its review.

CONCLUSION
Often FDA’s drug approval and withdrawal decisions are understood to be
focused on the benefits and risks as defined in the preapproval clinical trials, which
generally do not capture broader, population-level considerations, such as the ways
in which provider and patient behaviors—actual use of the drug—may alter a drug’s
safety or effectiveness. For many drugs, this approach works well. But for some
drugs with particularly problematic population health impacts, including those
associated with provider and patient behaviors such as opioids, it is necessary for
FDA to look beyond its traditional mode for making benefit-risk determinations, and
apply a public health approach. This Article describes FDA’s authority to consider a
wide range of data and information in determining whether a drug’s benefits
outweigh its risks, including patient and provider behaviors, both for drugs of misuse
as well as other drugs with externalities. Given this broad authority, as FDA

214 See, e.g., Henry T. Greely et al., Towards Responsible Use of Cognitive-Enhancing Drugs by the
Healthy, 456 NATURE 702 (2008) (describing the controversy around the off-label use of ADHD and other
drugs for cognitive enhancement).
215 See, e.g., Nicholas S. Fitz et al., Public Attitudes Toward Cognitive Enhancement, 7
NEUROETHICS 173, 174 (2014).
216 See, e.g., id.; see also Lucie Wade et al., Generating Genius: How an Alzheimer’s Drug Became
Considered a ‘Cognitive Enhancer’ for Health Individuals, 15 BMC MEDICAL ETHICS 37 (2014)
(describing the limited evidence supporting claims about donepezil’s (Aricept) effectiveness for cognitive
enhancement).
217 Cf. Lamkin, supra note 205, at 545–69 (making a similar argument about the regulation of
enhancement technologies). But see Dov Fox, Safety, Efficacy, and Authenticity: The Gap Between Ethics
and Law in FDA Decisionmaking, MICH. ST. L. REV. 1135, 1195 (2005) (arguing that, for enhancement
technologies the FDCA should be amended to require FDA to consider “individual and social values” and
“social consequences”); Craig Konnoth, Drugs’ Other Side Effects (on file with authors) (exploring
whether FDA should consider certain non-health effects in its drug approval decisions); Gary Marchant et
al., Integrating Social and Ethical Concerns into Regulatory Decision-Making for Emerging
Technologies, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 345, 351 (2010) (arguing that for enhancement technologies
“there is a strong presumptive case for allowing agencies to give express consideration to ethical and
social concerns in regulatory decisions”).
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intensifies its efforts to address the risks associated with opioid misuse,218 the lessons
learned from regulating opioids—including the need for consistency, developing
new methods for assessing drug risks and benefits, and limiting the agency to matters
of safety and effectiveness—should be extended beyond opioids to other drugs with
externalities.

218 See, e.g., Gottlieb, FDA Takes Important Steps to Stem the Tide of Opioid Misuse and Abuse,
supra note 70.

